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Abstract
This paper studies the impact of the United Kingdom’s June 2016 referendum to 
withdraw from European Union membership (“Brexit”) on foreign exchange (FX) 
exposures. We collect weekly data from 26 FTSE100, 10 IBEX35, and 17 DAX30 
nonfinancial multinational companies before and after the referendum. The 
referendum is shown to have had a positive and significant impact on the returns of 
the FTSE100 firms. Following the Brexit vote, firm-level FX exposures increased 
significantly (in absolute terms) for the 26 FTSE100 firms included in this study; 
however, this was not the case with the IBEX and DAX firms. On the other hand, the 
Brexit vote led to a reduction in exchange rate exposure at the market level. FX 
exposures in all three markets are reduced in absolute terms. Asymmetric 
specification models detect more German firms with significant FX exposures. After 
accounting for cross-sectional dependence in the residuals of firms within the same 
country, the majority of our findings are robust. 
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1. Introduction
On June 23, 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) voted to exit the European Union (EU), 
effective in 2019. This referendum caused turmoil in the foreign exchange and global stock 
markets, with the British pound (GBP) losing close to 15% of its value relative to the US dollar 
(USD) in the weeks following the referendum. Undoubtedly, the referendum was expected to 
initiate and deliver a complex combination of costs and benefits and is likely to cause 
significant operating risks for many nonfinancial companies (Dhingra, et al., 2016).
Research on the impact of the Brexit referendum is becoming more pertinent as the UK 
comes closer to leaving the EU, as a way to gain valuable insights into the impact of the actual 
Brexit event on foreign exchange (FX) exposures. We study the impact of the Brexit 
referendum at the individual firm and overall market levels of FX exposures by using a sample 
of British, Spanish, and German nonfinancial companies. Griffin and Stulz (2001) argue that 
firms might have high exposure coefficients but that such exposures may cancel each other out 
within industries because some are positive and others negative. Hence, FX rate shocks may 
be significant at the firm level but are diversified at the industry level. 
We, therefore, focus on the firm level and collect a sample of publicly traded multinational 
companies (MNCs) from the UK, Spain, and Germany. Comparing the UK’s nonfinancial 
sector to the nonfinancial sectors in Spain and Germany allows us to evaluate the impact of the 
referendum against a country with a similar stock market size (Spain) and a world-leading 
country (Germany) that both operate within the EU. 
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The 26 UK nonfinancial companies selected in this study comprise 31% of the market 
capitalization of the FTSE100, including firms such as AstraZeneca (AZN), Diageo (DEO), 
and Glaxo Smith Kline (GSK) that lead the index.1 The 10 nonfinancial firms selected from 
Spain’s IBEX35 account for 21% of the index by market capitalization, with Industria de 
Diseno Textil (ITX) and Ferrovial (FER) alone representing roughly 13% of the index market 
capitalization. Germany’s DAX30 index is dominated by manufacturing firms. The 17 
manufacturing firms selected comprise 58% of the market capitalization of the DAX30.
We select Spain and Germany as the number of firms in each of these two markets is 
comparable, allowing a comparable assessment of the impact of the Brexit vote. In addition, 
we select Germany and Spain since they have strong trade links with the UK. Germany is the 
UK’s largest EU trading partner, while Spain is the fifth largest (Department for International 
Trade, February 2019). Begg (2017) argues that supply chains are strongly interconnected. This 
argument is supported by the Financial Times (2018), which argues that the German economy 
should be concerned about a ‘no deal Brexit’ (a situation in which the UK exits the EU by the 
required deadline with no formal agreement in place) as tariffs may have a significantly 
negative impact on exports. Another reason for selecting Spain is the size of its financial 
market; the number of listed firms exceeded 3,000 in Spain (Table 1, Panel A), while the UK 
had more than 2,000 firms and Germany had approximately 500 firms during the period under 
study. With more than 3,000 firms, Spain is one of the top 10 largest stock markets in the world 
by number of firms; the UK, with greater than 2,000 listed firms, immediately follows Spain 
in size.
Brexit poses uncertainty for the value of the GBP and how the UK trades and generally 
interacts with the EU. Rhodes (2018) argues that a weaker pound implies British goods will be 
cheaper abroad, boosting sales and profits but may negatively affect import-based supply 
1Shire Plc was part of FTSE100 but was acquired by Takeda Pharmaceutical Company in January 2019.
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chains as a weaker pound would make imports more expensive. Large firms with complex 
supply chains present ambiguity to valuation in the post-referendum environment.
This study contributes to our understanding of how GBP fluctuations affect complex firms 
and provides significant information to policymakers, firms, and investors about the impact on 
FX exposures from Brexit. This study differs from other studies on the Brexit referendum as it 
focuses on FX exposure.
First, we use the difference-in-differences (DID) method, which allows us to test explicitly 
for significant differences between the group of British firms and the groups of German and 
Spanish firms before and after the Brexit referendum. 
Then, we estimate firm-level FX exposures in three periods: the pre-referendum period 
(05/30/2014–06/17/2016), the post-referendum period (06/24/2016–07/20/2018), and the full 
sample period (05/30/2014–07/20/2018). We run time-series regressions of changes in FX rates 
against the stock returns, controlling for market effects (see Jorion, 1990). We find that FX 
exposure following the Brexit vote increases significantly (in absolute terms) for the 26 
FTSE100 firms but not for the IBEX and DAX firms. This paper distinguishes between positive 
and negative exposure and explains the characteristics of good and bad news for British, 
Spanish, and German nonfinancial firms. 
Market-level exposure is also studied. In the pre-referendum period, all three markets were 
significantly exposed to GBP/EUR at a 1% level of significance. The Brexit referendum has a 
significant effect on all three indexes, reducing the market exposure of the IBEX to the 
GBP/EUR exchange rate, making current exposures insignificant. It also reduces the market 
exposure of the DAX to the GBP/EUR exchange rate, currently at the 10% level. As expected, 
the most interesting case is the FTSE. The FTSE index was significantly positive exposed to 
GBP/EUR at a 1% level of significance in the pre-referendum period, whereas it is significantly 
negative exposed to GBP/EUR at the 1% level in the post-referendum period. Thus, its 
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exposure changes from positive to negative, resulting in an insignificant FTSE exposure to the 
GPB/EUR exchange rate for the full sample period. 
Our work seeks to uncover the channel of the impact the Brexit referendum has had by 
studying interaction effects among the market index, the currency, and the referendum. Thus, 
we can identify the firms for which systematic risk or FX exposures increase after the 
referendum. The scenario that captures an interaction effect among the index, the currency, and 
the referendum for German firms highlights the fact that the impact of the referendum is 
nebulous, and that affects German firms in complex ways.
Finally, we study asymmetric models of FX exposure for our nonfinancial firms in the 
FTSE100, IBEX35, and DAX30 and discuss the implications of our results for the strategy of 
British, Spanish, and German firms after the Brexit vote.
For model validation and robustness checks, our model passes the tests for stationarity, 
multicollinearity, and misspecification. Following Muller and Verschoor (2006), and Krapl 
(2017), we test for volatility clustering in exchange rates and find no clustering effect in the 
GBP/EUR rate. Finally, to consider cross-sectional dependence in the residuals of firms within 
the same country (see Williamson, 2001; and Allayannis and Ihrig, 2001), we redesign the 
structure of the error terms and determine that the majority of our findings remain valid. 
In the next section, we review the relevant literature and formulate our research hypotheses. 
Section 3 provides our methodology. Section 4 presents the sample and summary statistics. 
Section 5 validates our model and offers the empirical results. Section 6 tests the robustness of 
the results, accounting for cross-sectional dependence in the residuals of firms within the same 
country. Section 7 discusses the implications for firm strategy. The final section concludes.
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2. Related literature and hypothesis development
This study is related to two strands of academic literature. The first is the recent but 
expanding literature on the impact of the Brexit referendum and the UK’s actual exit from the 
EU on financial markets. The second is the literature on FX exposure.
2.1 Literature on the impact of the Brexit referendum 
In this section, we discuss the literature related to the Brexit referendum. The UK has been 
a member of the EU for over 20 years, an economic agreement that dictates the free movement 
of capital, labor, and goods among member countries. Changes to the UK’s status will alter 
how UK firms will interact with EU member countries. Begg (2017) discusses how imports 
and exports from the UK are interlinked with EU firms and advises that Brexit will have an 
impact on the UK and the 27 other EU nations. The impact of the complexity for supply chains 
is reflected in the study by Erken et al. (2018) on the impact of Brexit with respect to import 
and export activities between UK firms and the EU.
Plakandaras et al., (2017) examine whether the sudden depreciation of the GBP relative to 
the USD is due to the reaction of market participants to Brexit or whether the result of the 
referendum has little impact on the USD/GBP FX rate. They estimate linear and nonlinear 
econometric and machine learning models and evaluate out-of-sample forecasts of the FX rate 
and its realized volatility in the pre- and post-Brexit periods. They quantify the uncertainty 
caused by the referendum using an index based on news related to economic uncertainty. They 
argue that with a daily forecasting horizon, their models adhere closely to the evolution of the 
observed FX rate and that most of the depreciation is based on the uncertainty caused by Brexit.
Tielmann and Schiereck (2016) find an overall negative effect of the Brexit referendum on 
the value of European logistics companies. Schiereck et al., (2016) establish that the reaction 
of bank stock prices to the Brexit announcement was more severe than the reaction to the 
Lehman bankruptcy, but the response of the credit default swap market was far more subdued.
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Jackowicz et al., (2017) study price adjustments on the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) 
following the Brexit vote. They find that prices of stocks in the WSE declined due to the 
referendum; however, the decline was not more severe for firms that are dependent on 
European markets or on export activities overall. 
Dhingra et al., (2018) discuss the economic consequences of Brexit, arguing that lower 
trade due to reduced integration between the UK and the EU will significantly offset any 
benefits to the UK of not contributing to the EU budget. 
Samitas et al., (2018) argue that the EU will suffer more economic damage than the UK. 
They employ an agent-based model and test for the short-term and long-term effects of Brexit 
on the financial stability of the EU and UK. They confirm predictions of other studies regarding 
the output cost of Brexit with emphasis on the EU and show that financial stability is a key 
issue, with the banking system suffering major losses on both sides of the English Channel, 
especially over the longer term. They suggest that policymakers should consider dynamic 
effects that may be caused by UK banks moving to the EU after Brexit. They conclude that if 
banks in the UK choose to relocate, the negative effects on the EU may be mitigated.
The conclusions of each study show how the economy at large is impacted through Brexit, 
but there is little firm-level analysis showing how the economic implications have affected 
individual firms. This empirical study provides further detail on whether FX exposure of 
companies in the UK or European markets have been more affected by the referendum.
This study fills the gap in the literature by assessing the impacts on FX exposure to the UK, 
German and Spanish nonfinancial firms. Oehler et al., (2017) analyze the abnormal returns on 
UK stocks after the referendum. They suggest there is a systematic impact on the value of 
stocks after the initial vote. More specifically, they examine whether firm-level 
internationalization helps to explain abnormal returns. They find that stocks of firms with a 
higher proportion of domestic sales realize more negative abnormal returns than stocks of firms 
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with more sales abroad, i.e., a higher degree of international diversification. While firm-level 
internationalization induces abnormal returns on the trading day after the referendum, it has no 
relevant pricing effect in the following days. 
Caporale et al., (2018) examine the effects of Brexit on uncertainty in European financial 
markets by applying long-memory techniques (both parametric and semi-parametric). They 
examine whether the Brexit referendum leads to any changes in the degree of persistence of 
the FTSE100 Implied Volatility Index (IVI) and the implied volatilities (IVs) of the GBP vis-
à-vis the other main currencies traded in the FX market, namely, the EUR, the USD, and the 
Japanese yen (JPY). They split their sample to compare the stochastic properties of the series 
under study before and after the referendum and find an increase in the degree of persistence 
in all cases except for the GBP/JPY, whose persistence declined after the Brexit referendum. 
Regarding the long-term impact, Caporale et al., (2018) show that analysts generally 
suggest a higher long-term risk to the value of the GBP relative to other currencies based on 
the shock of the Brexit referendum. This predicted volatility of the GBP along with complex 
company structures produces significant exposure for MNCs that trade with the EU. 
Based on the previous discussion, we develop the following main hypothesis about how 
the referendum affects stock returns of individual FTSE100 companies.
H1. There is a drop in stock returns after Brexit.
2.2 Literature on foreign exchange exposure
There is extensive literature on international finance analyzing the effects of changes in FX 
rates on corporate cash flows and firm value (e.g., Dumas, 1978; Flood and Lessard, 1986; 
Jorion, 1990; Bartov and Bodnar, 1994; and Oxelheim and Wihlborg, 1995; He and Ng, 1998; 
Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Williamson, 2001; Bodnar and Wong, 2003; Bartram and Karolyi, 
2006; Priestley and Ødegaard, 2007; Bartram and Bodnar, 2012; Akay and Cifter, 2014) that 
rely on constant, linear and symmetric models.
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By studying firm- and market-level FX exposure, Hutson and Laing (2014) suggest that 
complex business structures and revenue generation models are associated with higher FX 
exposure. In the short term, the currency markets can react with an immediate devaluation of 
the GBP due to a political shock. Following the Brexit referendum, the GBP was devalued 
from 1.5 to 1.2 USD and the devaluation can have a positive or negative impact on firms 
depending on where and how they operate.
We posit the following hypotheses on how the referendum affects the FX exposure at the 
individual firm and market levels.
H2. The foreign exchange exposure at firm and market levels increases after the referendum.
H3. The foreign exchange exposure at firm and market levels after the referendum is most 
severe for British firms.
We also try to uncover the channel of the impact of the Brexit referendum on investors' 
firm- and market-level returns. We study interaction effects between a given market index and 
the referendum, the currency and the referendum, and a combination of the index, the currency, 
and the referendum. Toward this end, we posit the following hypotheses.
H4a: The referendum negatively affects firm- and market- level returns.
H4b: The referendum increases in absolute value the index exposure at the firm level.
H4c: The Brexit vote increases in absolute value the exchange rate exposure at both firm and 
market levels.
H4d: The referendum increases in absolute value both the index and currency exposure, at the 
firm level.
The literature continues with asymmetric FX cash flow exposures, discussing why they 
can be asymmetric. One reason is that there is a lag in a firm’s decision to enter/exit a foreign 
market (see Section 2.2). The reason for this behavior is that market entry/exit costs are 
incurred by expanding/contracting operations in foreign markets.
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Asymmetric hedging behavior is another reason cash flows may be asymmetrically 
exposed to FX shocks. The use of currency derivatives with asymmetric payouts, such as 
currency options, can result in asymmetric FX exposures. FX cash flow asymmetry can also 
result from managers altering the timing and size of financial hedges, even if these hedges have 
symmetric payouts. According to Bodnar et al., (1998), 50% of firms periodically (and 10% 
frequently) alter the timing and size of their FX hedges to fit in their market view. 
Another reason for asymmetry in FX cash flow exposures is the use of FX pass-through 
and its relationship to a firm's pricing-to-market strategy. When dealing with an appreciation 
in the USD, export firms have the choice to pass through the adverse effect of the change in 
the FX rate onto their foreign customers by increasing prices denominated in the foreign 
currency. 
Pass-through as an FX hedging strategy is an important reason why corporate cash flows 
can be asymmetrically exposed to FX shocks (Froot and Klemperer, 1989; Marston, 1990; 
Kanas, 1997; and Bodnar et al., 2002). 
Krapl (2017) analyzes FX cash flow and equity exposures of a sample of U.S. multinational 
firms. Focusing on asymmetry in FX cash flow exposures to the direction and magnitude of FX 
shocks, he finds that asymmetry persists in several alternative measures of FX cash flow 
exposure. He argues that market-related factors, in addition to cash flow-based reasons need to 
be considered when exploring FX equity exposure. He also emphasizes that models with 
asymmetric specifications detect more firms with significant FX exposures.
Based on the previous discussion, we posit the following hypothesis regarding how the 
referendum affects the asymmetry of FX exposure.




We follow the Difference-in-differences technique of Card and Krueger (1994) to test our 
first hypothesis:
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦(ΔSS )
𝑡
+ 𝛾1𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 +
+ 𝛾2𝐹𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 + 𝛾3𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝐹𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 + 𝑢𝑡
(1)
where the term  is the return on the market index, which controls for market movements, 𝑅𝑚,𝑡
 is the common stock return of the ith firm, and is the end-of-period FX rate for a change 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 (ΔSS )𝑡
in GBP/EUR as measured by the domestic price of the foreign currency.2 Thus, a positive (ΔSS )𝑡
denotes a domestic currency depreciation.
The Brexit dummy takes the value of one for the weeks after the Brexit referendum of 
06/24/2016 and zero otherwise. The FTSEfirm dummy takes the value of one for firms that 
belong to the FTSE100 and zero otherwise. The interaction term is BrexitFTSEfirm, which 
captures the firms that are in the FTSE100 during the period after the referendum. We correct 
for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity with the Newey–West procedure. 
The interaction term is the difference-in-differences (DID) estimator. If we ignore the 
impacts of the market index and the currency, namely , this is strictly, 𝛽𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 = 𝛽𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 = 0
speaking, the method used by Card and Krueger (1994):
           (1a)𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛾1𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐹𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 + 𝛾3𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝐹𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 + 𝑢𝑡
The difference-in-differences between the treatment and the control group is the DID 
estimator under Eq. (1a), while Eq. (1b) is Eq. (1) without the impact of Brexit in Eq. (1):
2 The bilateral FX rate, S, is the price of the foreign currency in units of the home currency of the exporting firm. 
(If the UK is the exporter and EUR is the currency of the foreign market, the FX rate is GBP/EUR).
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           (1b)𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦(ΔSS )𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡
We also modify Eq. (1) to account for negative and positive currency returns. More 
specifically, we consider the impact of the Brexit referendum:











+ 𝛾1𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐹𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 + 𝛾3𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝐹𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 + 𝑢𝑡
      (1’)
In Eq. (1’), currency returns are decomposed into negative and positive return vectors, (










= min {(ΔSS )𝑡,0} 𝛽 ‒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝛽 +𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦
in the company’s stock return due to depreciation/appreciation in the GBP versus the EUR. 
3.2 Firm-level foreign exchange exposure
We estimate the relationship between the simple return of a company versus the return of 
its index and currency. The constant linear model literature represents the exposure of the 
company to the market index and its currency. The regression is estimated using four years of 
weekly simple returns for each firm, for its related index and for its currency. Our method takes 
the shock caused by the Brexit vote in 2016 into account:
 (Changes in stock prices; Jorion, 1990) (2)𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦(ΔSS )𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
The difference between Eq. (1b) and Eq. (2) is that in Eq. (2), we run a time-series 
regression of the firm’s return against the index return and the exchange rate return, while in 
Eq. (1b), we pool the data and run the returns of all firms against the market and changes in the 
exchange rates.
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3.3 Analyzing asymmetry to the direction of foreign exchange rate changes
To test for asymmetry in FX exposures to the direction of FX shocks, we follow Koutmos 
and Martin (2003) and Muller and Verschoor (2006) as follows:











The difference between Eq. (1’) and Eq. (3) is that in Eq. (3), we run firm-by-firm 
regressions, while in Eq. (1’), we run the returns of all firms together against the market, the 
changes in the exchange rates, and the dummy variables.
3.4 Market-level foreign exchange exposure
We further estimate FX exposure at the market level to assess whether the effect of the  
Brexit referendum is systematic or firm specific. We estimate the following equation:
 (Changes in stock prices; Jorion, 1990)             (2’)𝑅𝑚,𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽𝑚,𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦(ΔSS )𝑡 + 𝜀𝑚,𝑡
where  measures market-level FX exposure in GBP/EUR. Similarly, to test for 𝛽𝑚,𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦
asymmetry in FX market exposures with respect to the direction of FX shocks, we estimate the 
following equation.











4. Sample and summary statistics
This study comprises the nonfinancial companies in the FTSE100, IBEX35,3 and DAX30 
indexes. Table 1 presents the number of firms and information regarding their scope and details 
on market capitalization to show the importance of the nonfinancial sector to each index (for 
further details please see Appendix A1).
3The IBEX was significantly affected by political events during the study period, including the Catalonian 
declaration of independence, which caused the IBEX to fall approximately 7% over one year.
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[Insert Table 1]
We compare stock returns for the 26 FTSE100 firms, 10 IBEX35 firms, and 17 DAX30 
firms before and after the Brexit referendum. We have a total of 217 weekly observations for 
the period 05/30/2014–07/20/2018. We divide the sample into two equal time periods: the pre-
referendum period (05/30/2014–06/17/2016) and the post-referendum period (06/24/2016–
07/20/2018) with 108 weekly observations in each.
Table 2 reports summary statistics, skewness (S), kurtosis (K) and p-values for Jarque-Bera 
tests for stock returns, market index returns and currency returns (GBP/EUR).4 All of the stock 
returns are leptokurtic, indicating a high probability of high-magnitude shocks. 12 out of 26 
FTSE100, four out of 10 IBEX35, and 11 out of 17 DAX30 firms have negatively skewed 
returns. 
 [Insert Table 2]
The lowest average return in the entire sample is generated by Distribuidora Internacional 
de Alimentac (DIA), a firm in the IBEX35, at −0.43%, and the highest is from Evraz, a 
FTSE100 firm that averages a 1.07% return. The lowest average return prior to the Brexit vote, 
shown in Panel B, is for a FTSE100 firm, Tesco (−0.50%), and the highest is for a DAX30 
firm, Covestro (1.27%). Finally, the lowest average return after the Brexit vote, shown in Panel 
C, is for DIA (−0.72%), and the highest is for Evraz (1.07%).
During the full sample period, the currency returns are negatively skewed, indicating that 
large negative shocks are more frequent than large positive shocks. However, during the two 
sub-periods, before and after the Brexit referendum, currency returns are positively skewed. 
Currency returns are leptokurtic during the full sample period and for the two sub-periods, 
before and after Brexit, indicating a high probability of high-magnitude shocks.
4The Jarque-Bera test statistic is for the null hypothesis that the dependent variable is normally distributed.
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During the full sample period and the period before the referendum, index returns are 
negatively skewed. However, during the period after the referendum, index returns are mixed. 
Specifically, the FTSE returns are positively skewed, while returns for the other two indexes 
are negatively skewed.
For the full sample and for the post-referendum period, index returns are leptokurtic. 
During the period before the referendum, FTSE index returns are leptokurtic, while IBEX and 
DAX are platykurtic, indicating a higher probability of high-magnitude shocks in the British 




Before making the estimations, the models must pass basic tests to meet key assumptions 
for regression models. More specifically, stationarity tests show that the stock returns, index 
returns and the GBP/EUR exchange rate are stationary.5 Since the time series are stationary, 
we can proceed with estimations using OLS. We use two diagnostics tests for multicollinearity. 
The first one is the variance inflation factor (VIF). The rule of thumb is that if the VIF is equal 
to or higher than four, there is a multicollinearity problem. The highest value of the VIF for 
our dataset is 1.20, which is far below the threshold of four, so we are not concerned about 
multicollinearity. We also estimate the variance-covariance matrix of the fitted coefficients of 
the regression model. The rule of thumb is that if the pairwise correlation of the fitted 
coefficients has an absolute value equal or higher than 50%, there is a multicollinearity 
problem. The highest value of the correlation coefficient is 48.03% (in absolute value) while 
5 Results are available upon request.
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the mean (median) value is 24.95% (26.92%) in absolute value. So, again we do not detect 
multicollinearity according to this test.6 
Following Dominguez and Tesar (2006), we are not interested in testing a specific version 
of the CAPM, nor are we testing whether exchange rate risk is priced. We use Eqs (1) - (3)' as 
a context for isolating the association between returns and exchange rates for a cross-section 
of firms. Hence, we do not study for omitted variable bias. We also conduct a Ramsey RESET 
test, and conclude that our models do not suffer from misspecification.7
Finally, we test for the volatility-clustering phenomenon in exchange rates. Following 
Muller and Verschoor (2006) and Krapl (2017), we use an Engle's Lagrange multiplier test to 
determine the presence of ARCH effects in exchange rates. Based on our dataset, there are no 
ARCH effects in the GBP/EUR exchange rate, so we can employ ordinary least squares 
estimation with Newey and West (1987) HAC robust standard errors. 
5.2 Difference-in-differences (DID) based on symmetric and asymmetric models
To evaluate H1, we use the DID method. The results are given in Table 3.
[Insert Table 3]
Table 3 shows that for the regression of Eq. (1), the Brexit coefficient is negative and 
significant at a 1% significant level, which means that there is a decline in stock returns after 
the Brexit vote, supporting H1. The FTSEfirm coefficient (the treatment effect) is negative but 
insignificant, while the interaction term (the DID estimator), which captures the impact on 
firms in the FTSE100 during the period after the referendum, is positive and significant only 
at the 10% level.
6 Results are available upon request.
7 Results are available upon request.
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If we ignore the impact of the market index and the currency, namely, if 𝛽𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 =
, then the treatment effect, the Brexit and the interaction term become 𝛽𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 = 0
insignificant as indicated in Εq. (1a) shown in Panel A of Table 3.
Εq. (1b) pools all the firms together and determines the impact of the market and the 
currency on returns. Under this model, FX exposure is insignificant, and the index is again 
significant. Panel B of Table 3 shows the average change in returns before and after the Brexit 
vote for the control group, which includes the 10 IBEX35 and the 17 DAX30 firms, and the 
treatment group, including of the 26 FTSE100 firms. The difference in the differences between 
the treatment and the control groups is the difference-in-differences estimator under the model 
given in Eq. (1). 
When we account for negative and positive currency returns, the results remain the same, 
and the coefficients  in Eq. (1') are insignificant. 𝛽 ‒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦,𝛽 +𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦
5.3 The impact of Brexit on the FTSE100, IBEX35 and DAX30
To evaluate H2 and H3, we first analyze FX exposure based on symmetric models at a firm 
level. In Eq. (2), we conduct stock return regressions for each firm with respect to bilateral 
exchange rates (BERs) to measure FX exposure in Eq. (2) using weekly data for the period 
05/30/2014–07/20/2018. The coefficient  is adjusted for market movements. We 𝛽𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦
correct for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity using the Newey–West procedure. 
Simple returns for all nonfinancial firms are correlated with the returns of their respective 
index. The different correlations to the index may be driven by domestic versus foreign 
manufacturing operations in the domestic market.
The results of the BER regressions show that 11 of the 26 FTSE100 firms (42.31%) in the 
sample have a significant FX exposure at least, at a 10% significant level as shown in Panel A 
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of Table 4.8 Five (19.23%) firms have positive exposures to GBP/EUR, and the other six 
(23.08%) have negative exposures. An example of a negative exposure is Unilever (ULVR), 
which has a statistically significant (at 1%) currency exposure of −0.38. In contrast, Next 
(NXT) has a statistically significant positive currency exposure of 0.75. This finding indicates 
that when the GBP weakens, relative to the EUR, NXT’s returns suffer, affecting its equity 
valuation. 
Then, we study the periods before (Panel B of Table 4) and after the Brexit vote (Panel C 
of Table 4). Before the Brexit vote, only Smiths Group (SMIN) has a positive FX exposure at 
a 5% significant level among the 26 FTSE firms. After the Brexit vote, the situation changes 
radically, with seven (nine) firms, or 26.92% (34.62%) out of the 26 FTSE firms have a 
significant FX exposure at least at a 5% (10%) level. Six firms (23.08%) have negative 
exposure to GBP/EUR, and the other three (11.54%) have positive exposure.
Out of the 10 IBEX35 firms, only ITX is positively exposed to GBP/EUR at a 1% 
significance level for the full sample period (see Table 4). The same firm, ITX, is the only firm 
out of the 10 IBEX35 firms positively exposed to GBP/EUR at a 5% level before the 
referendum. However, none of the 10 IBEX35 firms has significant exposure to GBP/EUR 
after the Brexit referendum. A positive exposure indicates that when the EUR strengthens, ITX 
returns weaken. However, after the referendum, the strengthening EUR does not affect ITX’s 
returns.
Finally, out of the 17 DAX30 firms, only the Merck Group is positively exposed to 
GBP/EUR at a 10% significance level for the full sample period and at 1% before the 
referendum. After the Brexit referendum, only Siemens is positively exposed to GBP/EUR 
among the 17 DAX30 firms. These results offer statistical evidence in support of H3 at the firm 
8Out of 26 FTSE100 firms in the sample, 26.92% have a significant FX exposure at least at the 5% level (results 
are available upon request).
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level, since according to the results shown in Table 4, the number of British firms with 
significant exposure to the GBP/EUR increases after the referendum. However, these results 
do not support H2 at the firm level, since the numbers of DAX30 and IBEX35 firms exposed 
to GBP/EUR do not increase after the referendum.
[Insert Table 4]
We then move to evaluate H2 and H3, analyzing FX exposure based on symmetric models 
at the market level. In Panel D of Table 4, we present the findings from estimating Eq. (2’) to 
determine FX exposures for each of our three national stock markets. For the full sample period, 
the DAX and IBEX are significantly exposed to GBP/EUR at a 1% level, while the FTSE is 
not exposed to GBP/EUR at standard significance levels. However, in the pre-referendum 
period, all three markets are significantly exposed to GBP/EUR at 1%. The Brexit referendum 
has a significant effect on all the three indexes. After the Brexit referendum, the market 
exposures for both the IBEX and the DAX to GBP/EUR become insignificantly and 
significantly exposed at 10% respectively.
The most interesting case as expected, is the FTSE. While in the pre-referendum period, 
the FTSE is positively exposed to GBP/EUR at 1%. In the post-referendum period, it is 
negatively exposed to GBP/EUR at 1%. Since, its exposure changed from positive to negative, 
before and after the Brexit vote, the exposure coefficient of the FTSE for the full sample is 
insignificant. 
Therefore, the Brexit vote leads to a reduction in the FX rate exposure at the market level, 
not to an increase as H2 states. All the three markets’ FX exposures fall in absolute terms.
We note that while there is moderate exposure for the DAX and IBEX, there is significant 
exposure for the FTSE, supporting H3 at market level. This finding suggests that tariffs 
expected to be imposed post-Brexit could cause significant damage to export for UK 
nonfinancial firms, and revenues and consequently to the equity valuations of those companies. 
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This result is inconsistent with Samitas et al., (2018) who claim that the German economy is 
affected more by the Brexit referendum, as the above analysis shows more exposure for the 
FTSE. Moreover, in Panel C of Table 6, after the Brexit vote, the number of the FTSE100 firms 
in the sample exposed to appreciations and depreciations in GBP/EUR increases from five to 
12 (46.15%), confirming H3. Rolls-Royce (RR) and ULRV are exposed to both depreciation 
and appreciation of GBP/EUR. 
5.4 The impact of Brexit under different scenarios
To evaluate H4, we start with H4a which suggests that the Brexit referendum negatively 
affects firm- and market level- returns. In this scenario, we study the difference in stock returns 
before and after the referendum, holding the market index and currency returns constant. We 
add a Brexit dummy, , in Eq. (2). If the dummy is positive, then stock returns are 𝛾1𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡
higher after the referendum than before (keeping other factors constant). 
 [Insert Table 5]
More firms are affected by Brexit in a negative way supporting H4a. Out of the 26 FTSE100 
firms in the sample, 19.23% (34.62%) have a significant FX exposure at least at the 5% (10%) 
level, as indicated in Table 5. Kingfisher PLC (KGF) and Coca-Cola HBC (CCH) go from 
exposed to unexposed, while all the other firms remain the same at the same level of 
significance.9 For the other three firms in the FTSE100, the impact of the Brexit vote is negative 
and significant at 5%. Of the 10 IBEX35 firms, the impact of the Brexit referendum is 
significantly negative for ITX and SGRE at 5%. Of the 17 DAX30 firms, no firm is 
significantly exposed to GBP/EUR. For Fresenius (FRE), the impact of the Brexit vote is 
negative at 5%.
9Results are available upon request.
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At the bottom of Table 5, we also present the FX response coefficients for each of our three 
national stock markets. With respect to H4a, the DAX and IBEX are significantly exposed to 
GBP/EUR, while the FTSE is not.
We then evaluate H4b, which states that the Brexit vote increases in absolute value the 
index exposure. At the firm level, we add a multiplicative dummy, , to Eq. (2) 𝛾2𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑅𝑚,𝑡
that captures an interaction effect between the market index and the referendum, and the 
difference in index exposure before and after the referendum. H4b can also be read as “the vote 
increases in absolute terms, the systematic risk at the firm level”. Five out of the 26 FTSE100 
firms have a significant FX exposure of at least at 5% as shown in Table 5. Barratt and KGF 
go from exposed at a 5% level to unexposed, while Smith and Nephew (SN) goes from exposed 
at a 5% level to exposed at a 1% level.10 The Brexit vote increases the systematic risk only for 
Smurfit Kappa Group (SKG). 
Of the 10 IBEX35 firms in the sample, ITX and Viscofan have significant FX exposures at 
5%, the same firms that have significant exposures in evaluating H4a, as indicated in Table 5. 
The Brexit referendum decreases the level of systematic risk only for SGRE, where the impact 
of the referendum is significantly negative at 5%. 
Of the 17 DAX30 firms, systematic risk for Siemens increases while that of Heidelberg-
Cement (HEI) decreases due to the Brexit referendum, as indicated in Table 5. 
In other words, H4b is supported by one firm at 5% and one at 10% from among the 26 
FTSE100 firms, but not by any of the 10 IBEX35 firms and by only one out of the 17 DAX30 
firms; hence, for the majority of firms, H4b is not supported.
H4b is not applicable for the three national stock markets, because in this case the market 
index is a dependent variable, not an independent variable. 
10Results are available upon request.
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To evaluate H4c, which postulates that the referendum increases FX exposure at the firm 
level, we study the interaction effect between the currency and the referendum and the 
difference in FX exposure before and after the referendum. In this scenario, we add a Brexit 
multiplicative dummy, , into Eq. (2). Out of the 26 FTSE100 firms in the sample, 𝛾3𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡(ΔSS )𝑡
SMIN has a significant FX exposure at 5% and two firms at 10%. All other firms become 
insignificant. Of the 10 IBEX35 firms in the sample, only ITX has a significant FX exposure 
at 10%. Of the 17 DAX30 firms in the sample, Merck has a significantly positive FX exposure 
at 5%. These findings are shown in Table 5. In other words, H4c is supported by three out of 
the 26 FTSE100 firms, by one out of the 10 IBEX35 firms and by one out of the 17 DAX30 
firms; therefore, for the majority of firms, H4c is not supported.
The Brexit referendum increases the FX exposure of Associate British Foods (ABF) and 
Siemens, based on the fact that the impact of the Brexit referendum is significantly positive at 
5%. We do not have statistical evidence that the Brexit referendum increases or decreases the 
FX exposure of any of the 10 IBEX35 firms.
We also evaluate H4c at the market level. All three market indexes are positively exposed 
to GBP/EUR at 1%. Moreover, the Brexit referendum significantly (at the 1% level) decreases 
the FX exposure of all three markets, which is against H4c at the market level.
Finally, using interaction terms, we evaluate H4d, that postulates that the referendum 
increases in absolute value both the index and currency exposure at the firm level. We add two 
Brexit multiplicative dummies into Eq. (2). Out of 53 firms, 𝛿2𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛿3𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡(ΔSS )𝑡
only SMIN, Merck, and ITX have positive FX exposures, and SN and HEI have negative FX 
exposures. The Brexit referendum increases (decreases) the systematic risk only for SKG 
(SGRE) and increases the FX exposure of ABF.11 It also decreases the FX exposures of Mondi 
11Results are available upon request.
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and Croda. The Brexit vote does not affected the FX exposure of the 10 IBEX35 firms. Of the 
17 DAX30 firms, only Siemens (HEI) is positively (negatively) affected through the index at 
5% level of significance. 
The final case, (H4d) captures interaction effects among the index, currency, and the 
referendum. We find more German firms affected by Brexit with a significant FX exposure. In 
other words, H4d is supported only for German firms.
In determining the FX response coefficients for each of the three national stock markets 
under the fourth scenario (H4d), this scenario is not applicable because now the market index 
is the dependent variable, not an independent variable. 
5.5 Asymmetry in the direction of the foreign exchange exposure shocks 
In this section, we evaluate H5. Table 6 reports FX exposures estimated using Eq. (3) and 
presents the statistical significance of FX exposure asymmetries.
[Insert Table 6]
When we decompose currency returns into negative and positive returns, the BER 
regressions show that two (five) out of the 26 FTSE100 firms, namely, 7.69% (19.23%) are 
exposed to appreciations of the GBP/EUR at a confidence level of at least at 5% (10%). In 
addition, SN and KGF have significant FX exposure to a depreciation of the GBP/EUR at a 5% 
level and DEO at 10%. Eight firms out of 26 (30.77%) are significant at least at 10% as shown 
in Panel A of Table 6. Four firms are exposed to changes in the GBP/EUR but not to 
deprecations or appreciations of GBP/EUR. In contrast, Tesco is negatively exposed to 
appreciations in the GBP/EUR (at 10%) but not to changes in GBP/EUR.12 This percentage is 
similar to the percentage from the symmetric model (11 out of 26 firms); therefore, the evidence 
does not support H5.
12Results are available upon request.
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Out of the 10 IBEX35 firms, only ITX and Viscofan have significantly positive FX 
exposures at 1% respectively due to depreciation and appreciation of GBP/EUR. The same 
firms are also exposed to changes in GBP/EUR. Thus, we do not have evidence to support H5.
Finally, out of the 17 DAX30 firms, three are exposed to appreciations in the GBP/EUR 
rate and two to depreciation, but none of these firms are exposed to changes of GBP/EUR. 
Then, we analyze FX exposure asymmetry as to the direction of FX shocks before the Brexit 
vote (Table 6, Panel B). KGF and SMIN have significantly negative and positive FX exposures 
at 5%, respectively, due to appreciation in the GBP/EUR. NXT has a positive exposure at 10% 
to appreciations of GBP/EUR. KGF and RR have significantly positive and negative FX 
exposures at 5%, respectively, to depreciations in GBP/EUR. Finally, SN has a significantly 
negative FX exposure to the depreciation in the GBP/EUR at 10%, as indicated in Table 6 
(Panel B). It is a total of five (19.23%) out of the 26 FTSE100 firms. Interestingly, KGF, a 
British retailing MNC and the third largest commercial property developer in the UK, is 
exposed to both depreciation and appreciation in the GBP/EUR.
A total of four out of the 10 IBEX35 firms are exposed to depreciation of GBP/EUR, while 
no Spanish firm is exposed to appreciations of GBP/EUR. Finally, two out of the 17 DAX30 
firms have FX exposure to depreciation in GBP/EUR, and only BMW has a significantly 
positive FX exposure at 5% to appreciations in GBP/EUR. It is a total of three firms (17.65%) 
out of the 17 DAX30 firms (Table 6, Panel B).
After the Brexit vote, the firm numbers exposed to GBP/EUR change considerably. For the 
FTSE100, three firms are exposed before and after the referendum. KGF and SMIN are 
exposed before but not after the referendum. However, most firms become exposed after the 
referendum. Moreover, RR and SN were exposed before the referendum, but their exposures 
are intensified after the referendum. NXT was exposed to appreciation of GBP/EUR before the 
referendum but becomes exposed to depreciation after the referendum. 
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On the other hand, out of the 10 IBEX35 firms, only FER/Viscofan has a negative/positive 
exposure to depreciation/appreciation of GBP/EUR at a 5% level of significance after the 
referendum, in contrast to the exposure of four out of the 10 IBEX35 firms  (40%)  before the 
referendum, supporting our H3. Moreover, none of the Spanish firms that were exposed to 
GBP/EUR before the Brexit vote, that is, ITX, Grifols, Acerinox, and CIE, is exposed after the 
referendum.
The number of German firms, exposed to appreciation and depreciation in the GBP/EUR 
increases from three to five out of 17 (29.41%), which is contrary to H5. Moreover, Linde and 
Continental have positive exposure at 1% and 5%, respectively, to appreciation in the 
GBP/EUR. Siemens and Linde have positive and negative exposures, respectively, at 5% to 
depreciation in the GBP/EUR. Linde is exposed to both depreciation and appreciation in the 
GBP/EUR.
However, compared to German firms, more British firms in percentage terms, are exposed 
to GBP/EUR after the Brexit vote but we notice more FX exposures during GBP/EUR 
appreciations than GBP/EUR depreciations only for German firms (Table 6, Panel C), which 
is consistent with previous studies (see Koutmos and Martin, 2003; Muller and Verschoor, 
2006; Krapl, 2017). These asymmetric FX exposures of German firms is consistent with the 
argument that FX exposure reflects a lag in the  reactions of firms with respect to their exit/entry 
decisions, which is documented in the literature (Baldwin and Krugman, 1989; Baldwin, 1990; 
Ljungqvist, 1994). More specifically, the result is attributed to exit decisions and market exit 
costs incurred by German firms leaving the UK. Another reason for this result is that the 
managers of German firms alter the timing and size of their financial hedges to fit in their 
market views. 
This asymmetric behavior is also consistent with the impact of the Brexit referendum and 
Brexit on financial markets literature. More specifically, Davies and Studnicka (2018) study 
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how news of Brexit affects expectations through stock returns. They show that while most 
firms had negative returns following the referendum, there was substantial heterogeneity in 
their changes relative to expectations. They argue that this heterogeneity is explained by the 
firm’s global value chain, with firms heavily exposed to the EU and UK doing worse than firms 
that are less heavily exposed.  
Table 6 (Panel D) presents the findings from estimating Eq. (3’) to determine the FX 
response coefficients for each of our three national stock markets for different time periods. In 
the full sample period, the DAX and the IBEX have positive exposures to depreciations in the 
GBP/EUR at 1%, and the DAX is also positively exposed to appreciations in the GBP/EUR at 
5%. The FTSE is exposed to neither appreciations nor depreciations in GBP/EUR at standard 
levels. In the pre-referendum period, all three markets were significantly positive exposed to 
GBP/EUR appreciation and depreciation at standard levels (Table 6, Panel D).
The Brexit referendum appears to have a significant effect on all the three indexes. After 
the Brexit vote, the IBEX is not significantly exposed to GBP/EUR in its appreciations or its 
depreciations and the DAX is positively exposed only to the depreciation in GBP/EUR at 10%. 
However, again, the most interesting case is the FTSE which is significantly negative exposed 
to appreciations of GBP/EUR at 5%. Therefore, the Brexit vote leads to a change in asymmetric 
exposure to FX rate changes at the market level. 
6. Robustness checks
We test the robustness of our results by considering the seemingly unrelated regressions 
(SUR) method proposed by Zellner (1962). The SUR method has been used by Williamson 
(2001) to analyze exchange rate exposure and competition in the automobile industry. 
Williamson (2001) uses SUR to account for cross-sectional dependence in the residuals of 
firms within the same country. Allayannis and Ihrig (2001) also estimate their regression 
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equation using SUR for their sample of U.S. manufacturing industries to account for the cross-
equation correlations in the error terms. 
Similar to Williamson (2001), we use the SUR method for cross-sectional dependence in 
the residuals of firms within the same index. The SUR results are summarized and contrasted 
with the base case scenario results in Appendix A2, Table A2. We employ the Breusch–Pagan 
(BP) test for error independence, which detects statistically significant cross-sectional 
correlations between the errors in the return equations for each index.13 We conclude that there 
is a statistically significant correlation between the errors in the return equations of the group 
of the 26 FTSE100 firms, the group of the 10 IBEX35 firms and the group of 17 DAX30 firms 
for the full sample period, the pre-referendum period and the post-referendum period, used to 
estimate Eq. (2) and Eq. (3), or when we add dummy variables to Eq. (2) to study H4a–H4d. 
To test the robustness of H2 and H3, we estimate Eq. (2) for the full sample, pre-referendum 
and post-referendum periods, using the SUR method.14 
For the full sample, the results of the BER regressions show that 12 of 26 (46.16%) 
FTSE100 firms have a significant FX exposure at least at 10%, compared to 11 (42.31%) in 
the base case scenario, as indicated in Panel A of Table A2.15 Five (19.23%) of these firms 
have positive exposures to GBP/EUR, and the other seven (26.93%) have negative exposures, 
compared to five and six, respectively, in the base case scenario. So, the results are very similar 
to the base case scenario.
The results are the same for the 26 FTSE firms as in the base case scenario prior to the 
Brexit vote, while after the Brexit vote the results are similar to the base case scenario as shown 
in Panel A of Table A2.
13 Results are available upon request.
14 As in the base case scenario, simple returns for the nonfinancial index components are correlated to the returns 
of the index. 
15Out of 26 FTSE100 firms, 34.62% have a significant FX exposure at least at the 5% level (results are available 
upon request).
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For the 10 IBEX35 firms, the results using the SUR method are similar to the base case 
scenario for the full sample period, the pre-referendum period and the post-referendum period 
(see Table A2). Finally, for the 17 DAX30 firms under the SUR estimation, one firm is 
positively exposed at a 5% level of significance and two firms at 10% in the full sample period, 
while in the base case scenario only Merck Group is significant at the 10% level. Before the 
vote, the results remain the same as in the base case scenario. After the Brexit vote, for the 17 
DAX30 firms under the SUR estimation, two firms are positively exposed at a 5% level of 
significance and one at 10%. 
Hence, our results regarding the hypotheses H2 and H3 are robust to the SUR estimation, 
since, as shown in Table A2, after the referendum, the number of Spanish and German firms 
exposed to GBP/EUR does not increase but the number of British firms exposed to GBP/EUR 
does increase. The SUR estimation confirms the base case scenario results and hence supports 
hypothesis H3 but not H2 at the firm level.
We then test the robustness of H4a–H4d allowing for cross-sectional dependence in 
residuals of firms within the same index. We conclude that there is a statistically significant 
correlation between the errors in the return equations for the group of the 26 FTSE100 firms, 
the group of the 10 IBEX35 firms and the group of the 17 DAX30 firms under all four models. 
First, for the case of H4a, out of the 26 FTSE100 firms, 30.76% (34.62%) have a significant 
FX exposure at a 5% (10%) confidence level as indicated in Panel B of Table A2, compared 
with 19.23% (34.62%) in the base case scenario. Hence, the number of firms exposed to the 
10% level remains the same while the number of firms exposed at 5% level increases. The SUR 
estimation confirms the base case scenario results and therefore we confirm H4a. For the IBEX, 
the results under the SUR estimation are the same as under the base case scenario. For the DAX 
firms, there is only one difference that under the base case scenario of the 17 DAX30 firms, no 
firm is exposed to GBP/EUR while under the SUR estimation, Merck is positively exposed at 
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a 10% level of significance. The impact of Brexit is the same for the 26 FTSE100, 10 IBEX35, 
and 17 DAX30 firms under the SUR estimation as it is under the base case scenario.
When we test the robustness of H4b at the firm level, the only difference is that under the 
SUR estimation, two more firms are positively exposed at the 5% level, as shown in Panel B 
of Table A2. The Brexit vote increases systematic risk for the same firms as in the base case 
scenario. The results regarding H4b, under the SUR estimation, are identical to the base case 
scenario results for the 10 IBEX35 firms and 17 DAX30 firms. Hence, the SUR estimation 
confirms the base case scenario results: for the majority of firms, H4b is not supported.
We then test the robustness of H4c. Out of the 26 FTSE100 firms, the only difference is 
that under the SUR estimation one additional firm has a significantly positive FX exposure at 
5%, while it is unexposed under the base case scenario. The impact of Brexit under the SUR 
estimation is similar as under the base case scenario. 
Regarding H4c, the results under the SUR estimation are similar to the base case scenario 
results for the 10 IBEX35 firms and the 17 DAX30 firms. The only difference is that under the 
SUR estimation only ITX among the 10 IBEX35 firms has a significant FX exposure at the 5% 
confidence level and Merck (a DAX firm) has a significantly positive FX exposure at 1% as 
compared to the 5% level in the base case scenario. These findings are shown in Table A2. The 
Brexit vote increases the FX exposure of ABF and Siemens since the impact of the referendum 
is significantly positive at 5%. We do not have statistical evidence that the Brexit vote increases 
or decreases the FX exposure of any of the 10 IBEX35 firms; as in the base case scenario for 
the majority of firms, H4c is not supported.
Then, we test the robustness of H4d, which captures interaction effects among the index, 
the currency, and the referendum. More German firms are affected by Brexit with a significant 
FX exposure under the SUR estimation compared to the base case scenario. H4d is supported 
only for German firms.
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Finally, we test the robustness of H5 using the SUR method to estimate Eq. (3) for the full 
sample, and for the pre-referendum and post-referendum periods. The BER regressions using 
the SUR method show that five (six) out of 26 FTSE100 firms, namely, 19.23% (23.07%), are 
exposed to appreciations in the GBP/EUR exchange rate at a significance level of at least 5% 
(10%), compared to two (five) firms under the base case scenario. Hence, the SUR method 
detected more FTSE100 firms with asymmetric exchange rate exposure compared to the base 
case scenario. 
A total of 10 out of the 26 FTSE100 firms (38.46%) are significantly exposed to either 
appreciation or depreciation in the GBP/EUR rate at a significance level of at least 10% as 
illustrated in Panel B of Table A2, compared to eight firms in the base case scenario. Three 
firms are exposed to changes in GBP/EUR but not to depreciations or appreciation only, and 
they are the same as in the base case scenario. This percentage is comparable to the percentage 
from the symmetric model (12 out of 26 firms), so H5 is not supported. Therefore, we reach 
the same qualitative result with the SUR estimation method as with the base case scenario for 
the British firms, and hence we conclude that our result is robust. 
For the 10 IBEX35 firms, we reach the same qualitative results with the SUR estimation 
method as in the base case scenario, as shown in Panel C of Table A2. Therefore, our result is 
robust. 
Finally, out of the 17 DAX30 firms, three are exposed to appreciation in the GBP/EUR rate 
and one is exposed to depreciation, but none of these firms are exposed to changes of 
GBP/EUR, as in the base case scenario. 
Then, we analyze FX exposure asymmetry to the direction of FX shocks before the Brexit 
vote (Table A2, Panel C). A total of four firms out of the 26 FTSE100 firms (15.38%) are 
exposed, compared to five firms in the base case scenario. So, the results under the SUR 
estimation are similar to those under the base case scenario. For the 10 IBEX35 firms and the 
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17 DAX30 firms, the results regarding FX exposure asymmetry to the direction of FX shocks 
prior to the Brexit vote under the SUR estimation are identical to the base case scenario results 
(Table A2, Panel B). Hence, the results for pre-referendum are robust. 
After the Brexit vote (Table A2, Panel C), for the 26 FTSE100 firms and the 10 IBEX35 
firms, we reach the same qualitative results with the SUR estimation method as in the base case 
scenario. For German firms, after the Brexit vote, the qualitative results are similar under SUR 
estimation to the base case scenario results. Hence, we confirm that the FX exposure after the 
referendum is more asymmetric for German firms under the SUR estimation. Again, we note 
greater FX exposure during GBP/EUR appreciation than depreciation only for German firms.
7. Implications for firm strategy
Our focus is to understand the impact of the Brexit referendum on individual firm-level and 
market-level FX exposures of a sample of 26 FTSE100, 10 IBEX35, and 17 DAX30 
nonfinancial firms. Towards this reason, we provide a battery of statistical tests. In this section, 
we discuss the implications of this study for firm strategy.
The implications for firm strategy can be categorized based on each statistical test. Starting 
with the DID method, we show that the Brexit vote has a positive impact on FTSE100 
nonfinancial firms relative to the firms in the control group (DAX30 and the IBEX35 firms). 
Thus, an event such as Brexit affects exchange rates in a negative manner but stock markets in 
a positive manner, supporting our H1 at the firm level.
To study firm-level and market-level FX exposures, we use symmetric models. After the 
Brexit referendum, the number of FTSE100 firms with significant exposure to GBP/EUR 
increased from one to nine. So, an event such as the Brexit vote must be an alert to UK firms 
to use more currency derivatives and other methods to hedge currency exposures, supporting 
H3 at the firm level. However, firms in other EU markets (DAX30 and IBEX35 firms) should 
not be concerned to the same extent given that the referendum significantly affected British 
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nonfinancial firms but had no significant impact on Spanish or German nonfinancial firms, as 
H2 states. 
Then, we study market-level FX exposure using symmetric models. Firms and investors 
should expect that stock markets will move after events such as Brexit. The Brexit referendum 
leads to a reduction in FX rate exposure at the market level, not to an increase as H2 states. Our 
results support our hypothesis (H3) that FX exposure at the market level after the referendum 
is most severe for the British firms. All three markets’ FX exposures fall in absolute terms, but 
FTSE is the most interesting case.
Our third methodology captures interaction effects among the index, the currency and the 
referendum for German firms, highlighting the fact that the vote is a nebulous event that affects 
German firms in a complex manner, implying that events such as Brexit should not be 
downgraded in other countries. 
The fourth statistical test studies firm and market-level FX exposures using asymmetric 
models. We decompose currency returns into negative and positive returns. After Brexit, the 
number of German firms exposed to appreciation or depreciation in the GBP/EUR rate 
increases, in contrast to our hypothesis (H5) that after the referendum exposure would be most 
asymmetric for British firms. Still, as a percentage there are more British firms exposed to 
GBP/EUR after the Brexit vote compared to German firms.
8. Conclusions
We analyze the reaction of the foreign exchange exposures of 26 FTSE100, 10 IBEX35, 
and 17 DAX35 nonfinancial firms to the Brexit announcement by collecting 217 weekly 
observations for the period 05/30/2014–07/20/2018. We divide the sample into two equal time 
periods: pre-referendum (05/30/2014–06/17/2016) and post-referendum (06/24/2016–
07/20/2018) with 108 weekly observations each. We use four different statistical tests to 
evaluate our research hypotheses (the difference-in-differences method; firm and market-level 
33
FX exposure using symmetric and asymmetric models; interaction effects among the index, the 
currency and the referendum; firm and market-level FX exposure using asymmetric models).
Our models passed tests for stationarity, multicollinearity, and misspecification. We also 
test for volatility clustering in exchange rates and do not find any clustering effects. Accounting 
for cross-sectional dependence in the residuals of firms within the same country, the majority 
of our findings still hold. 
We find the referendum has a positive and significant impact on the returns of the FTSE100 
firms. We also find that following the Brexit vote, firm-level FX exposures increase 
significantly (in absolute terms) for the 26 FTSE100 firms, but is not the case for the IBEX and 
DAX firms. Moreover, the Brexit vote leads to a reduction in exchange rate exposure at the 
market level. We highlight that models with asymmetric specifications detect more German 
firms with significant FX exposures. This finding is attributed either to the market exit costs 
that German firms would have to incur to leave the UK, or to the possibility that managers of 
German firms alter the timing and size of financial hedges to fit their market views. Identifying 
the reason could be the focus of a further study.
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Number of firms in sample.
Panel A: Number of firms in sample and market capitalizations.
Index Number of Companies Percentage of Companies % Market Capitalization %
FTSE 101
Non‐financial 26 26% 31%
Financial 75 74% 69%
IBEX 35
Non‐financial 10 29% 21%
Financial 25 71% 79%
DAX 30
Non‐financial 17 57% 58%
Financial 13 43% 42%
Total 166
Panel B: Number of Listed Companies
Spain UK Germany
2014 3419 1858 595
2015 3623 2398 555
2016 3480 2307 531
2017 3110 2053 450
2018 2979 2089 465
Table 2.
Summary statistics. The second column of Panel A offers the industry that each firm belongs.
Panel A: Full Sample period
Index Industry Company N Mean Median SD S K p-Value 
JB
FTSE Tobacco BAT 217 0.0010 0.0037 0.0295 -0.1350 4.8100 0.0000
FTSE Pharma. GSK 217 0.0001 -0.0004 0.0254 -0.4007 4.6472 0.0000
FTSE Pharma. AZN 217 0.0017 0.0016 0.0323 0.1747 5.4496 0.0000
FTSE Beverages DEO 217 0.0022 0.0022 0.0247 0.4363 5.2840 0.0000
FTSE CG ULRV 217 0.0026 0.0038 0.0272 0.7129 6.8438 0.0000
FTSE CG RB 217 0.0017 0.0044 0.0264 -0.1420 4.8439 0.0000
FTSE Pharma. Shire 217 0.0023 0.0017 0.0471 0.0947 11.6653 0.0000
FTSE Tobacco IMB 217 0.0008 0.0032 0.0288 -0.0803 4.0196 0.0081
38
FTSE Retailing Tesco 217 0.0002 0.0009 0.0435 0.0381 4.5561 0.0000
FTSE BM CRH 217 0.0028 0.0024 0.0326 0.2122 3.2697 0.3189
FTSE Aerospace BAE 217 0.0026 0.0000 0.0275 0.4529 4.5040 0.0000
FTSE Aerospace RR 217 0.0010 -0.0018 0.0461 -0.4574 8.4740 0.0000
FTSE ME SN 217 0.0020 0.0019 0.0289 0.2156 4.1149 0.0016
FTSE Fashion Burberry 217 0.0023 0.0017 0.0357 -0.4120 4.7935 0.0000
FTSE Food Prc. ABF 217 -0.0004 0.0000 0.0329 -0.4581 4.5095 0.0000
FTSE Retail NXT 217 0.0003 0.0025 0.0367 -0.3337 7.7703 0.0000
FTSE Packaging Mondi 217 0.0035 0.0060 0.0337 -0.4810 4.4487 0.0000
FTSE Packaging SKG 217 0.0045 0.0062 0.0416 1.9719 17.9847 0.0000
FTSE Chemicals JMAT 217 0.0009 0.0027 0.0373 1.1228 9.2298 0.0000
FTSE Retail KGF 217 -0.0007 -0.0006 0.0315 -0.6572 4.8343 0.0000
FTSE Engineer. SMIN 217 0.0030 0.0024 0.0323 0.0281 3.6466 0.1489
FTSE Chemicals Croda 217 0.0033 0.0066 0.0283 -0.0743 4.3497 0.0002
FTSE Bottling CCH 217 0.0039 0.0031 0.0340 0.3012 4.5994 0.0000
FTSE Retail M&S 217 -0.0010 0.0020 0.0345 0.1280 4.7831 0.0000
FTSE Housebuild Barratt 217 0.0026 0.0049 0.0382 -0.4446 4.3844 0.0000
FTSE Steel Evraz 217 0.0107 0.0051 0.0825 1.1935 6.9470 0.0000
IBEX Retailing ITX SA 217 0.0020 0.0020 0.0291 0.0931 3.0479 0.8462
IBEX Transport. FER 217 0.0009 0.0032 0.0282 -0.3177 2.7599 0.1242
IBEX CE ACS 217 0.0015 0.0019 0.0389 0.0975 3.6442 0.1290
IBEX Pharma. Grifols SA 217 0.0017 0.0022 0.0347 -0.3451 3.9456 0.0020
IBEX Steel MT 217 0.0018 -0.0044 0.0653 1.3973 9.8551 0.0000
IBEX Engineering SGRE 217 0.0031 0.0067 0.0506 -0.3053 3.7331 0.0163
IBEX Meat,Casings Viscofan SA 217 0.0019 0.0020 0.0255 0.0863 3.7346 0.0762
IBEX Steel Acerinox SA 217 0.0005 -0.0016 0.0452 0.5569 4.4113 0.0000
IBEX Automotive CIE 217 0.0063 0.0090 0.0367 -0.6088 4.3868 0.0000
IBEX Retail DIA 217 -0.0043 -0.0013 0.0453 0.0404 4.5588 0.0000
DAX Automotive BMW 217 0.0001 0.0005 0.0360 0.1892 4.6716 0.0000
DAX Automotive Volkswagen 217 -0.0003 -0.0019 0.0446 -0.3804 13.6247 0.0000
DAX Apparel Adidas 217 0.0048 0.0053 0.0375 -0.1955 5.9938 0.0000
DAX Automotive Daimler 217 -0.0002 0.0033 0.0352 -0.0694 3.7729 0.0616
DAX Tires Continental 217 0.0012 0.0000 0.0343 0.2593 3.6039 0.0570
DAX FMCG Henkel 217 0.0014 0.0013 0.0253 -0.2314 3.4342 0.1620
DAX FMCG Beiersdorf 217 0.0018 0.0007 0.0251 -0.0134 4.0716 0.0055
DAX Pharma. Bayer 217 0.0001 0.0009 0.0336 -0.0980 3.3512 0.4814
DAX Health care FRE 217 0.0035 0.0051 0.0314 -0.1280 4.0419 0.0055
DAX Chemicals Merck 217 0.0019 0.0026 0.0291 -0.1319 2.8605 0.6687
DAX Health care FME 217 0.0030 0.0026 0.0283 0.0960 5.7523 0.0000
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DAX Industrial Siemens 217 0.0013 0.0034 0.0303 -0.0926 3.3348 0.5159
DAX Chemicals BASF 217 0.0005 0.0016 0.0316 -0.1937 3.4116 0.2358
DAX BM HEI 217 0.0011 0.0013 0.0312 0.0562 2.9161 0.9150
DAX Industrial Thyssenkrup
p 217 0.0009 0.0014 0.0434 0.3535 3.6077 0.0197
DAX Industrial gas Linde 47 0.0069 0.0052 0.0300 0.0770 2.9882 0.9769
DAX Chemicals Covestro 145 0.0085 0.0077 0.0400 -0.0187 3.7345 0.1951
Currency and Index returns
GBP/EUR 217 -0.0004 -0.0014 0.0121 -0.0065 3.7586 0.0741
FTSE100 217 0.0007 0.0030 0.0187 -0.2498 4.5614 0.0000
IBEX35 217 0.0000 0.0022 0.0260 -0.2078 3.1978 0.3838
DAX30 217 0.0015 0.0035 0.0247 -0.3335 3.6010 0.0261
Panel B: 05/30/2014-06/17/2016
Index Company N Mean Median SD S K p-Value JB
FTSE BAT 108 0.0018 0.0039 0.0271 -0.1374 3.7867 0.2096
FTSE GSK 108 -0.0011 -0.0017 0.0256 -0.3701 3.4827 0.1726
FTSE AZN 108 -0.0008 0.0001 0.0292 0.1752 4.0692 0.0579
FTSE DEO 108 -0.0004 0.0001 0.0246 -0.0698 3.2584 0.8235
FTSE ULRV 108 0.0016 0.0038 0.0246 -0.2632 2.8415 0.5066
FTSE RB 108 0.0031 0.0045 0.0236 0.5568 4.5797 0.0002
FTSE Shire 108 0.0028 0.0073 0.0510 -0.5964 13.8443 0.0000
FTSE IMB 108 0.0031 0.0076 0.0283 -0.1737 2.8499 0.7244
FTSE Tesco 108 -0.0050 -0.0021 0.0504 0.0217 3.8557 0.1917
FTSE CRH 108 0.0025 0.0062 0.0358 0.1624 3.1615 0.7437
FTSE BAE 108 0.0017 0.0004 0.0287 0.1793 3.8336 0.1568
FTSE RR 108 -0.0032 -0.0032 0.0502 -1.0654 9.1571 0.0000
FTSE SN 108 0.0020 0.0019 0.0329 0.3521 3.6435 0.1291
FTSE Burberry 108 -0.0023 -0.0014 0.0371 -0.2837 5.0337 0.0000
FTSE ABF 108 -0.0001 0.0024 0.0334 -0.3921 3.1709 0.2348
FTSE NXT 108 -0.0016 0.0046 0.0272 -1.7662 9.5919 0.0000
FTSE Mondi 108 0.0024 0.0055 0.0379 -0.5398 4.2976 0.0016
FTSE SKG 108 0.0028 0.0075 0.0364 -0.3366 3.1957 0.3310
FTSE JMAT 108 -0.0012 0.0031 0.0382 0.1220 3.5325 0.4621
FTSE KGF 108 -0.0009 -0.0004 0.0313 -0.3737 3.7563 0.0786
FTSE SMIN 108 0.0020 0.0018 0.0358 -0.1260 3.0126 0.8666
FTSE Croda 108 0.0010 0.0034 0.0304 -0.2963 3.4673 0.2777
FTSE CCH 108 0.0008 -0.0035 0.0351 -0.0744 3.7878 0.2354
FTSE M&S 108 -0.0015 -0.0016 0.0372 0.3075 5.4469 0.0000
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FTSE Barratt 108 0.0044 0.0074 0.0375 -0.1887 2.3082 0.2473
FTSE Evraz 108 0.0041 0.0001 0.0895 1.6398 8.3381 0.0000
IBEX ITX SA 108 0.0018 0.0039 0.0271 -0.1374 3.7867 0.2096
IBEX FER 108 -0.0011 -0.0017 0.0256 -0.3701 3.4827 0.1726
IBEX ACS 108 -0.0005 -0.0007 0.0440 0.1900 3.2623 0.6191
IBEX Grifols SA 108 0.0004 0.0041 0.0393 -0.4463 3.6112 0.0718
IBEX MT 108 -0.0030 -0.0131 0.0791 1.6205 9.1784 0.0000
IBEX SGRE 108 0.0088 0.0097 0.0541 -0.2302 3.2810 0.5196
IBEX Viscofan SA 108 0.0018 0.0039 0.0274 0.1197 2.8580 0.8401
IBEX Acerinox SA 108 -0.0007 -0.0017 0.0534 0.5419 3.8984 0.0116
IBEX CIE 108 0.0061 0.0096 0.0405 -0.6981 3.9476 0.0017
IBEX DIA 108 -0.0014 0.0009 0.0455 0.0532 3.3055 0.7902
DAX BMW 108 -0.0016 -0.0019 0.0425 0.1104 3.9134 0.1371
DAX Volkswagen 108 -0.0020 -0.0038 0.0563 -0.3218 10.6111 0.0000
DAX Adidas 108 0.0046 0.0062 0.0399 -0.5790 6.6988 0.0000
DAX Daimler 108 -0.0010 0.0022 0.0413 -0.0964 3.2061 0.8359
DAX Continental 108 0.0015 -0.0031 0.0408 0.2531 2.8841 0.5451
DAX Henkel 108 0.0019 0.0007 0.0275 -0.2861 3.1319 0.4603
DAX Beiersdorf 108 0.0009 0.0003 0.0281 0.1862 3.7576 0.2012
DAX Bayer 108 -0.0007 0.0005 0.0382 -0.2006 2.9501 0.6924
DAX FRE 108 0.0056 0.0079 0.0337 -0.2679 4.3830 0.0071
DAX Merck 108 0.0036 0.0031 0.0328 -0.1285 2.5870 0.5872
DAX FME 108 0.0044 0.0033 0.0319 0.2356 5.8820 0.0000
DAX Siemens 108 0.0001 0.0031 0.0328 -0.1556 3.0322 0.8023
DAX BASF 108 -0.0012 0.0002 0.0369 -0.1129 3.0484 0.8869
DAX HEI 108 0.0019 0.0030 0.0353 -0.0994 2.6666 0.7124
DAX Thyssenkrupp 108 -0.0006 -0.0027 0.0475 0.5061 3.8201 0.0220
DAX Linde 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA
DAX Covestro 36 0.0127 0.0123 0.0461 -0.4420 3.6539 0.4038
Currency and Index returns
GBP/EUR 108 0.0004 -0.0014 0.0122 0.0507 3.1546 0.9260
FTSE100 108 -0.0009 0.0025 0.0212 -0.2836 3.5032 0.2744
IBEX35 108 -0.0017 0.0013 0.0295 -0.1360 2.6210 0.6128
DAX30 108 0.0003 0.0048 0.0292 -0.2817 2.9203 0.4825
Panel C: 06/24/2016-07/20/2018
Index Company N Mean Median SD S K p-Value JB
FTSE BAT 109 0.0001 0.0037 0.0318 -0.1101 5.1651 0.0000
FTSE GSK 109 0.0013 0.0027 0.0253 -0.4316 5.8776 0.0000
FTSE AZN 109 0.0042 0.0036 0.0350 0.1087 5.8989 0.0000
FTSE DEO 109 0.0048 0.0062 0.0246 0.9570 6.9802 0.0000
FTSE ULRV 109 0.0037 0.0035 0.0297 1.2208 8.2164 0.0000
FTSE RB 109 0.0002 0.0041 0.0288 -0.4714 4.5613 0.0005
FTSE Shire 109 0.0018 -0.0036 0.0431 1.2098 6.6379 0.0000
FTSE IMB 109 -0.0015 0.0024 0.0293 0.0172 5.1042 0.0000
FTSE Tesco 109 0.0053 0.0049 0.0348 0.5757 4.7790 0.0000
FTSE CRH 109 0.0031 -0.0004 0.0291 0.3109 3.0904 0.4079
FTSE BAE 109 0.0035 0.0000 0.0264 0.8163 5.2827 0.0000
FTSE RR 109 0.0052 -0.0008 0.0414 0.7648 5.2605 0.0000
FTSE SN 109 0.0020 0.0025 0.0245 -0.1374 4.3087 0.0172
FTSE Burberry 109 0.0069 0.0069 0.0340 -0.5209 4.5953 0.0003
FTSE ABF 109 -0.0008 -0.0014 0.0326 -0.5295 5.9526 0.0000
FTSE NXT 109 0.0022 0.0016 0.0441 -0.0561 5.9830 0.0000
FTSE Mondi 109 0.0047 0.0064 0.0291 -0.2333 3.6551 0.2302
FTSE SKG 109 0.0061 0.0028 0.0463 2.9945 21.9289 0.0000
FTSE JMAT 109 0.0030 0.0013 0.0364 2.2962 15.6217 0.0000
FTSE KGF 109 -0.0005 -0.0010 0.0318 -0.9246 5.8443 0.0000
FTSE SMIN 109 0.0039 0.0027 0.0285 0.3863 4.5238 0.0013
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FTSE Croda 109 0.0055 0.0075 0.0259 0.3761 5.4517 0.0000
FTSE CCH 109 0.0069 0.0060 0.0327 0.8105 5.3334 0.0000
FTSE M&S 109 -0.0006 0.0031 0.0318 -0.1436 3.2810 0.6931
FTSE Barratt 109 0.0008 0.0039 0.0390 -0.6622 6.0527 0.0000
FTSE Evraz 109 0.0172 0.0143 0.0749 0.5438 4.4346 0.0006
IBEX ITX SA 109 0.0004 0.0005 0.0266 -0.0380 3.0403 0.9834
IBEX FER 109 0.0004 0.0029 0.0272 -0.3669 2.9669 0.2937
IBEX ACS 109 0.0035 0.0027 0.0331 0.0127 3.8713 0.1781
IBEX Grifols SA 109 0.0031 0.0002 0.0295 0.0300 3.6206 0.4136
IBEX ArcelorMitta 109 0.0066 0.0010 0.0476 0.3761 3.1430 0.2641
IBEX SGRE 109 -0.0026 0.0038 0.0465 -0.5604 4.2772 0.0014
IBEX Viscofan SA 109 0.0020 0.0006 0.0237 0.0372 5.0784 0.0001
IBEX Acerinox SA 109 0.0017 -0.0008 0.0353 0.6075 3.6273 0.0143
IBEX CIE 109 0.0065 0.0073 0.0326 -0.4005 4.7584 0.0002
IBEX DIA 109 -0.0072 -0.0019 0.0451 0.0238 5.8690 0.0000
DAX BMW 109 0.0017 0.0007 0.0282 0.6317 4.7639 0.0000
DAX Volkswagen 109 0.0013 0.0012 0.0287 0.0506 2.5630 0.6332
DAX Adidas 109 0.0050 0.0025 0.0351 0.3702 4.5469 0.0013
DAX Daimler 109 0.0006 0.0042 0.0280 0.1305 3.7981 0.2017
DAX Continental 109 0.0010 0.0032 0.0267 0.1804 4.2726 0.0188
DAX Henkel 109 0.0008 0.0023 0.0231 -0.1641 3.7733 0.2014
DAX Beiersdorf 109 0.0026 0.0019 0.0218 -0.3603 4.1690 0.0138
DAX Bayer 109 0.0010 0.0009 0.0286 0.2245 3.5049 0.3546
DAX FRE 109 0.0015 0.0038 0.0289 0.0150 3.3005 0.8129
DAX Merck 109 0.0002 0.0026 0.0249 -0.2804 2.9068 0.4801
DAX FME 109 0.0017 0.0014 0.0243 -0.3397 3.7580 0.0951
DAX Siemens 109 0.0025 0.0034 0.0276 0.0671 3.5987 0.4254
DAX BASF 109 0.0022 0.0038 0.0255 -0.1828 2.9206 0.7278
DAX HEI 109 0.0002 0.0003 0.0267 0.3350 2.9403 0.3579
DAX Thyssenkrup 109 0.0023 0.0040 0.0390 0.1212 2.8508 0.8320
DAX Linde 47 0.0069 0.0052 0.0300 0.0770 2.9882 0.9769
DAX Covestro 109 0.0072 0.0059 0.0379 0.1758 3.7427 0.2158
Currency and Index returns
GBP/EUR 109 -0.0011 -0.0016 0.0120 -0.0699 4.3685 0.0136
FTSE100 109 0.0024 0.0039 0.0159 0.0844 6.2825 0.0000
IBEX35 109 0.0016 0.0042 0.0220 -0.1801 3.9923 0.0796
DAX30 109 0.0026 0.0033 0.0194 -0.2068 4.0314 0.0606
GSK is in pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, and Consumer Goods. AZN is in pharmaceutical and biotechnology. 
BAE is in Aerospace, Arms Industry, and information security. Evraz is in steel and mining. ABF is in food 
processing and retailing. Mondi is in packaging and paper. Grifols is in Pharmaceutical and Chemicals. Adidas is 
in apparel and accessories. Bayer is in pharmaceuticals, life sciences, and chemicals. Merck is in chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals. Siemens is a conglomerate and Industry, Energy, Healthcare and Infrastructure & Cities 
represent the main activities of the company. Linde is a chemical company and the world's largest industrial 
gas producer by market share as well as revenue. ThyssenKrupp is a conglomerate, with products from and 
industrial services to high-speed trains, elevators, and shipbuilding. CE stands for civil engineering. CG stands 




Firm-level FX exposure response coefficients before and after the Brexit referendum.
Panel A










      0.9280***
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𝛽 ‒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 - - - 0.0292






























      0.0022***
[0.0007]
R-squared 30.85% 0.06% 30.79% 30.85%
Panel B
Brexit FTSEFIRM Return
Firms that do not belong to 
FTSE100 before 06/24/2016
0 0 0.0014
Firms that do not belong to 
FTSE100 after 06/24/2016 1 0 0.0020
Firms that belong to FTSE100 
before 06/24/2016 0 1 0.0009
Firms that belong to FTSE100 






Diff in Diff 
estimator
Average change in Returns before and after Brexit referendum
-0.0005 0.0013 0.0018
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Notes: Standard errors of estimates are reported in [brackets]. Standard errors are corrected for autocorrelation 
and heteroscedasticity with the Newey–West procedure. *significance at the 10% level, ** significance at the 5% 
level, *** significance at the 1% level. Brexit is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the weeks after 
the Brexit referendum 06/24/2016 and zero otherwise. FTSEfirm is a dummy variable that takes the value of one 
for the firms that belong to FTSE100 and zero otherwise. The interaction term captures the firms that belong to 
FTSE100 during the period after the referendum.
Table 4.
Bilateral FX exposures of stock and market returns. 
Panel A: Full Sample period














26 4 5 2 1 3 1 3 2 1
IBEX 
firms
10 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
DAX 
firms
17 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Total 
Sample
53 6 5 3 3 3 2 3 2 1
Panel B: 05/30/2014-06/17/2016














26 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
IBEX 
firms
10 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
DAX 
firms
17 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
Total 
Sample
53 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 0 0
Panel C: 06/24/2016-07/20/2018














26 2 5 2 1 1 1 1 4 1
IBEX 
firms
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DAX 
firms
17 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Total 
Sample
53 2 6 2 1 2 1 1 4 1
Panel D: Index Currency Exposure




















Notes: In this Table, we test the hypotheses H2 “The foreign exchange exposure at firm and market levels 
increases after the referendum” and H3 “The foreign exchange exposure at the firm and market levels after the 
referendum is most severe for British firms.” Standard errors of estimates are reported in [brackets]. Standard 
errors are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity with the Newey–West procedure. * significance at 
the 10% level, ** significance at the 5% level, *** significance at the 1% level. For space reasons, this table offers 
a summary of the firm exchange rate exposures (Panels A-C) from estimating Eq. (2). Panel D offers the index 
exchange rate exposures from estimating Eq. (2’). Separated into pre-referendum and post-referendum and full 
sample periods, we present the number of firms, N, the number of firms that are significantly exposed  N* (at 
10%), N**(at 5%), N***(at 1%), the number of firms that are significantly positive exposed N*(+)(at 10%), 
N**(+)(at 5%), N***(+)(at 1%), and the number of firms that are significantly negative exposed N*(-)(at 10%), 
N**(-)(at 5%), N***(-)(at 1%). For space reasons, we do not report the R-squares for each regression. The R-
squares for FTSE firms and the full sample period range from 9.38% to 49.20% with an average value of 29.24%. 
The R-squares for IBEX firms and the full sample period range from 22.35% to 54.17% with an average value of 
34.19%. The R-squares for DAX firms and the full sample period range from 17.83% to 77.67% with an average 
value of 50.07%. The R-squares for FTSE firms and the pre-referendum period range from 6.78% to 58.15% with 
an average value of 34.76%. The R-squares for IBEX firms and the pre-referendum period range from 23.87% to 
67.82% with an average value of 42.35%. The R-squares for DAX firms and the pre-referendum period range 
from 31.01% to 80.78% with an average value of 58.74%. Finally, the R-squares for FTSE firms and the post-
referendum period range from 6.42% to 50.86% with an average value of 25.65%. The R-squares for IBEX firms 
and the post-referendum period range from 8.97% to 40.67% with an average value of 24.86%. The R-squares for 
DAX firms and the post-referendum period range from 12.92% to 72.14% with an average value of 42.33%. The 
full results are available upon request.
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Table 5.
Bilateral FX exposures of stock and market returns under four hypotheses: (H4a) The referendum negatively affects the firm- and market- level returns. (H4b) The referendum 
increases in absolute value the index exposure at the firm level. (H4c) The Brexit vote increases in absolute value the exchange rate exposure at both firm and market levels. 




































26 0 0 0 0 3 0 2 1 1 2 2 1
IBEX 
firms
10 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
DAX 
firms
17 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 
Sample




































26 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 2
IBEX 
firms
10 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
DAX 
firms
17 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Total 
Sample








































10 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
DAX 
firms
17 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Total 
Sample



































26 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
IBEX 
firms
10 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
DAX 
firms
17 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
Total 
Sample
























26 0 1 0 2 0 0
IBEX 
firms
10 0 0 0 0 0 0
DAX 
firms
17 0 0 0 1 0 0
Total 
Sample

















































Notes: Standard errors of estimates are reported in [brackets]. Standard errors are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity with the Newey–West procedure. * 
significance at the 10% level, ** significance at the 5% level, *** significance at the 1% level. Brexit is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the weeks after the 
Brexit referendum 06/24/2016 and zero otherwise. We present the number of firms N, the number of firms that are significantly exposed N* (at 10%), N**(at 5%), N***(at 
1%), and the number of firms that are significantly positive exposed N*(+) (at 10%), N**(+)(at 5%), N***(+)(at 1%), and the number of firms that are significantly negative 
exposed N*(-)(at 10%), N**(-)(at 5%), N***(-)(at 1%). The full results are available upon request. For space reasons, we do not report the R-squares in each regression. The 
R-squares for FTSE firms under Model 1 range from 9.45% to 49.26% with an average value of 29.54%. The R-squares for IBEX firms, under Model 1 range from 22.43% to 
54.17% with an average value of 34.69%. The R-squares for DAX firms under Model 1 range from 18.51% to 77.68% with an average value of 50.34%. The R-squares for 
FTSE firms under Model 2 range from 10.47% to 49.47% with an average value of 29.59%. The R-squares for IBEX firms, under Model 2 range from 22.80% to 54.50% with 
an average value of 34.75%. The R-squares for DAX firms under Model 2 range from 17.94% to 77.69% with an average value of 50.35%. The R-squares for FTSE firms 
under Model 3 range from 9.42% to 49.36% with an average value of 29.65%. The R-squares for IBEX firms, under Model 3 range from 22.50% to 54.22% with an average 
value of 34.35%. The R-squares for DAX firms under Model 3 range from 18.14% to 77.70% with an average value of 50.20%. The R-squares for FTSE firms under Model 4 
range from 10.48% to 49.60% with an average value of 29.98%. The R-squares for IBEX firms, under Model 4 range from 22.84% to 54.66% with an average value of 35.00%. 
The R-squares for DAX firms under Model 4 range from 18.61% to 77.74% with an average value of 50.52%. 
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Table 6.
Bilateral FX exposures of stock and market returns: asymmetry to the direction of FX shocks.































































































26 4 3 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 2 0 1
IBEX 
firms
10 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
DAX 
firms
17 1 3 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
Total 
Sample



























































































26 2 4 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
IBEX 
firms




17 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Total 
Sample
























































































26 3 8 1 1 1 1 1 4 0 1 0 0 0 3 0
IBEX 
firms
10 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
DAX 
firms
17 2 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 2 0 0
Total 
Sample
53 5 13 2 1 2 1 1 6 0 1 2 1 2 3 0
Panel D: Index Currency Exposure
Full Sample period 05/30/2014-06/17/2016 06/24/2016-07/20/2018






Exposure due to 
depreciation of 
GBP/EUR
Exposure due to appreciation of 
GBP/EUR
Exposure due to 
depreciation of 
GBP/EUR








































Notes: Standard errors of estimates are reported in [brackets]. Standard errors are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity with the Newey–West procedure. * 
significance at the 10% level, ** significance at the 5% level, *** significance at the 1% level. For space reasons, this table offers a summary of the firm exchange rate exposures 
(Panels A-C) from estimating Eq. (3). Panel D offers the index exchange rate exposures from estimating Eq. (3’). Separated into pre-referendum and post-referendum and full 
sample periods, we present the number of firms N, the number of significantly exposed firms N*, the number of firms that are significantly positive exposed due to the 
depreciation of GBP/EUR N*(+)(at 10%),N**(+)(at 5%), N***(+)(at 1%), the number of firms that are significantly negative exposed due to the depreciation of GBP/EUR 
N*(-)(at 10%), N**(-)(at 5%), N***(-)(at 1%), the number of firms that are significantly positive exposed due to the appreciation of GBP/EUR N*(+)(at 10%), N**(+)(at 5%), 
N***(+)(at 1%), the number of firms that are significantly negative exposed due to the appreciation of GBP/EUR N*(-)(at 10%), N**(-)(at 5%), N***(-)(at 1%). The full 
results are available upon request. Linde is negatively exposed due to the depreciation of GBP/EUR and at the same time positively exposed due to the appreciation of GBP/EUR 
in the full sample and in the post-referendum periods. RR is positively exposed due to the depreciation of GBP/EUR and at the same time negatively exposed due to the 
appreciation of GBP/EUR in the post-referendum period. ULRV is negatively exposed due to the depreciation of GBP/EUR and at the same time due to the appreciation of 
GBP/EUR in the post-referendum period. For space reasons, we do not report the R-squares for each regression. The R-squares for FTSE firms and the full sample period range 
from 9.64% to 49.38% with an average value of 29.56%. The R-squares for IBEX firms and the full sample period range from 23.41% to 54.17% with an average value of 
34.68%. The R-squares for DAX firms and the full sample period range from 18.59% to 77.73% with an average value of 50.56%. The R-squares for FTSE firms and the pre-
referendum period range from 6.78% to 58.31% with an average value of 35.44%. The R-squares for IBEX firms and the pre-referendum period range from 24.73% to 69.02% 
with an average value of 43.16%. The R-squares for DAX firms and the pre-referendum period range from 31.08% to 80.79% with an average value of 58.99%. Finally, the R-
squares for FTSE firms and the post-referendum period range from 6.54% to 51.82% with an average value of 26.64%. The R-squares for IBEX firms and the post-referendum 
period range from 8.98% to 40.76% with an average value of 25.72%. The R-squares for DAX firms and the post-referendum period range from 13.20% to 72.39% with an 
average value of 43.02%. The full results are available upon request.
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Appendix A1.
We study exchange rate exposures; our data includes stock prices from 53 multinational 
firms (MNCs) from three developed countries. The firms and industries in our sample are as 
follows: Retailing (6), Pharmaceuticals (5), Chemicals (5), Automotive (4), Consumer Goods 
(2), Fast Moving Consumer Goods (2), Building Materials (2), Tobacco (2), Health Care (2), 
Packaging (2), Steel (2),Industrial (2), Aerospace (2), Engineering (2), Civil Engineering 
(1),Beverages (1), Tires (1), Apparel (1), Medical Equipment (1), Fashion (1), Food processing 
(1), Bottling (1), Transportation (1), Meat processing (1), Industrial gas (1) and Housebuilding 
(1). Below, we briefly describe each firm. We start with the 27 FTSE100 firms. They are all 
MNCs, listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and are part of the FTSE100 firms.
1. British American Tobacco (BAT) is the largest publicly traded tobacco firm in the world.
BAT is headquartered in London and has operations in around 180 countries. It has a 
primary listing on the LSE. It has secondary listings on other four major stock exchanges. 
2. GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) is a British pharmaceutical MNC headquartered in London. GSK 
was the world's sixth largest pharmaceutical firm as of 2015. It has a primary listing on the 
LSE. As of August 2016, it was the fourth largest on the LSE. It has a secondary listing on 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).
3. AstraZeneca (AZN) is a British Swedish pharmaceutical MNC. In 2013, it moved its head 
office to Cambridge. It is among the world's largest pharmaceutical firms. AZN has a main 
listing on the LSE and secondary listings on the NYSE and the OMX exchange.
4. Diageo is an alcoholic beverage MNC headquartered in London and it has offices on six 
continents and 80 countries. It was the world's largest distiller until being overtaken by 
China's Kweichow Moutai in April 2017. Diageo sells its products in over 180 countries. 
It has a primary listing on the LSE and a secondary listing on the NYSE. 
5. Unilever (ULRV) is a British-Dutch consumer goods MNC headquartered in London and 
Rotterdam. It is a dual-listed company consisting of Unilever plc, based in London, and 
Unilever N.V., based in Rotterdam. The two firms operate as a single business. Its products 
are available in around 190 countries and include food and beverages (about 40% of its 
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revenue), cleaning agents, beauty products, and personal care products. It is Europe’s 
seventh most valuable firm. ULRV owns over 400 brands, and 13 brands with sales of over 
one billion EUR. ULRV is organized into four main divisions - Foods, Refreshment 
(beverages and ice cream), Home Care, and Beauty & Personal Care. In the 2010s, the firm 
shifted its focus towards health and beauty brands and away from food brands showing 
slow growth. Unilever plc has a primary listing on the LSE.
6. Reckitt Benckiser Group plc (RB) is a British consumer goods MNC headquartered 
in Slough. It is a producer of health, hygiene, and home products. It was formed in 1999.
7. Shire Plc was a Jersey-registered, Irish-headquartered pharmaceutical MNC. Shire had its 
origins in the UK with a base in the US. It had its primary listing on the LSE and a 
secondary listing on NASDAQ. It was acquired by Takeda Pharmaceutical in January 
2019. Its products were available in 100 countries. The main offices were located in Dublin. 
8. Imperial Brands plc (IMB) is a British tobacco MNC headquartered in Bristol. It is the 
world’s fourth-largest international cigarette firm measured by market share after BAT and 
the world's largest producer of cigars. IMB produces has 51 factories worldwide, and its 
products are sold in over 160 countries. IMB is listed on the LSE. It is the 19th-largest of 
any company with a primary listing on the LSE. 
9. Tesco plc is a multinational groceries and general merchandise retailer with headquarters 
in Hertfordshire. It is the third-largest retailer in the world measured by gross revenues. It 
has shops in seven countries across Asia and Europe and is the market leader of groceries 
in the UK (where it has a market share of around 28.4%). The firm pulled out of the USA 
in 2013, but as of 2018 continues to see growth elsewhere. Since the 1960s, Tesco 
has diversified into areas such as the retailing of books, clothing, electronics, furniture, 
toys, petrol, software, financial services, telecoms, and internet services. It is the 28th-
largest of any company with a primary listing on the LSE.
10. CRH plc is an international group of building materials for the construction industry. The 
firm is domiciled in Ireland where it ranks as the largest Irish firm. CRH has a primary 
listing on the LSE and secondary listings on the Irish Stock Exchange and NYSE.
11. BAE Systems plc is a British defense, security, and aerospace MNC. Its headquarters are 
in London with operations worldwide. It is the largest defense contractor in Europe and 
among the world's largest defense firms; it was ranked as the third-largest based on 
applicable 2017 revenues. Its largest operations are in the UK and US. Other major markets 
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include Australia, India, and Saudi Arabia, which account for about 20% of BAE's overall 
sales. It is the biggest manufacturer in Britain. It was formed in 1999.
12. Rolls-Royce Holdings plc (RR) is a British engineering MNC, which designs, 
manufactures and distributes power systems for aviation and other industries. RR is the 
world’s second-largest maker of aircraft engines and has major businesses in the marine 
propulsion and energy sectors. RR was the world's 16th largest defense contractor in 2018 
when measured by defense revenues. RR is headquartered in London.
13. Smith & Nephew plc (SN) is a British medical equipment manufacturing MNC 
headquartered in London. It is an international producer of clinical therapy products. Its 
products are sold in over 120 countries.
14. Burberry Group PLC is a luxury fashion house and MNC, headquartered in London. It 
focuses on and distributes trench coats, ready-to-wear, outerwear, fashion accessories, 
fragrances, sunglasses, and cosmetics. In 2015, Burberry ranked 73rd in Interbrand's Best 
Global Brands report, alongside Louis Vuitton and Prada. It has stores in 51 countries.
15. Associated British Foods plc (ABF) is a British food processing and retailing MNC whose 
headquarters are in London. Its ingredients division is the world's second-largest producer 
of both sugar and baker's yeast and a major producer of other ingredients. Its grocery 
division is a major manufacturer of both branded and private label grocery products. Its 
retail division, Primark, has around 345 stores across Europe.
16. Next (NXT), is a British clothing, footwear, and home products retailer headquartered in 
Leicestershire. It has around 700 stores, of which 500 are in the UK and 200 across Europe, 
Asia, and the Middle East. NXT is the largest clothing retailer by sales in the UK, having 
overtaken Marks& Spencer in early 2012and 2014.
17. Mondi Group is an international packaging and paper group with around 100 production 
sites across more than 30 countries, predominantly in Europe, Russia, North America, and 
South Africa. It is fully integrated across the packaging and paper value chain - from the 
growing of wood and the manufacturing of pulp and paper to the conversion of packaging 
papers into corrugated packaging, industrial bags, extrusion coatings, and release liner. It 
has listings on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and the LSE.
18. The Smurfit Kappa Group plc is Europe's leading corrugated packaging firm and one of the 
leading firms in the world. SKG specializes in manufacturing paper-based packaging, with 
a network of paper, recycling, and forestry operations. It is an integrated producer, with 
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packaging plants sourcing the major part of their material requirements from the company's 
paper mills. In turn, the sourcing of recovered fiber and wood for the mills is managed 
through a combination of reclamation and forestry operations and purchases from third 
parties. It operates across 35 countries. Its head office is in Dublin.
19. Johnson Matthey (JMAT) is British specialty chemicals and sustainable technologies 
MNC headquartered in the UK. 
20. Kingfisher plc is a British retailing MNC headquartered in London, with regional offices 
located across the UK and Ireland. It is the largest home improvement retailer in Europe, 
and the third largest in the world (behind The Home Depot and Lowe's). It has stores, in 10 
countries across Europe. Kingfisher is also the third largest commercial property developer 
in the UK, with more than 1,200 buildings ranging from apartments to hotels. 
21. Smiths Group plc (SMIN) is a British multinational diversified engineering business 
headquartered in London. It has operations in over 50 countries. SMIN has five divisions. 
Smiths Detection is the world's largest manufacturer of sensors for the detection of 
explosives, weapons, chemical agents, biohazards, narcotics, and contraband. John Crane 
is a manufacturer of seals and associated products for the process industries. Smiths 
Medical is a manufacturer and supplier of specialty medical devices and equipment. Smiths 
Interconnect is a manufacturer of electronic and radio frequency components. Flex-Tek is 
a supplier of components to heat and move fluids and gases.
22. Croda International plc is a British specialty chemicals MNC based at the East Riding of 
Yorkshire. The firm's products include dietary supplements containing specialty lipids, 
such as omega-3 oils. Fatty acid amides, which add “slip” to plastic surfaces, so plastic 
bags, can be peeled apart easily. These products are sold to other manufacturing companies. 
Croda has factories in the UK and many countries around the world. 
23. Coca-Cola HBC A.G. (CCH) is the world's third-largest Coca-Cola anchor bottler in terms 
of volume with sales of more than 2 billion unit cases. Coca-Cola HBC’s shares are listed 
on the LSE with a secondary listing on the Athens Stock Exchange. CCH has been named 
the industry leader among beverage companies in the 2014 Dow Jones Sustainability 
Index (DJSI). It is headquartered in Zug, Switzerland.
24. Marks & Spencer Group plc (M&S) is a major British multinational retailer headquartered 
in London that specializes in selling clothing, home products, and luxury food products. In 
1998, the company became the first British retailer to make a pre-tax profit of over 
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£1 billion although subsequently, it went into a sudden slump. In recent years, its clothing 
sales have fallen whilst food sales have increased. In May 2018, it was confirmed that over 
100 stores would have closed by 2022 in a "radical" plan. 
25. Barratt Developments plc is one of the largest residential property development firms in 
the UK operating a network of over 30 divisions. It is located at Leicestershire. 
26. EVRAZ plc is a vertically integrated steel making and mining MNC with headquarters 
in London. It has operations mainly in Russia, but also across the world.
We then move to the10 IBEX35 firms. They are all MNCs, and part of the IBEX35 firms.
27. Industria de Diseño Textil, S.A. (ITX) in Textile Design Industry is a Spanish clothing 
MNC headquartered in Arteixo. Inditex, the biggest fashion group in the world, operates in 
93 markets worldwide. The company's flagship store is Zara. The majority of its stores are 
corporate-owned, while franchises are mainly conceded in countries where corporate 
properties cannot be foreign-owned. The firm operates a unique business model: instead of 
committing a large percentage of production for the next fashion season, the company 
commits a small amount and uses customer feedback and a production network to replenish 
stores with new and different products weekly. 
28. Ferrovial, S.A. is a Spanish multinational company involved in the design, construction, 
financing, operation (DBFO) and maintenance of transport infrastructure and urban 
services. The company is headquartered in Madrid. Ferrovial operates through four 
divisions in over 15 countries. Its Highway division finances and operates toll roads. The 
Airport sector has developed and produced airports. Its Construction business designs and 
constructs public and private works such as roads, highways, airports, and buildings. The 
company's Services sector oversees the maintenance of infrastructures, facilities and 
buildings, the collection and treatment of waste, and other types of public service. 
29. Actividades de Construcción y Servicios, S.A. (ASC) is an MNC dedicated to civil and 
engineering construction, all types of services and telecommunications. It is one of the 
leading construction firms in the world. The company was founded in 1997. Its 
headquarters are in Madrid and it is listed on the Bolsa de Madrid.
30. Grifols is an MNC and a pharmaceutical and chemical manufacturer. It produces blood 
plasma-based products, a field in which it is the European leader and largest worldwide, 
the firm also supplies devices and instruments, for clinical testing laboratories.
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31. ArcelorMittal S.A. (MT) is an MNC and a steel manufacturing firm headquartered in 
Luxembourg. MT was formed in 2006 and it is the world's largest steel producer; it is 
ranked 123 in the 2017 Fortune Global 500 ranking of the world's biggest corporations.
32. Siemens Gamesa Renewable Energy S.A. (SGRE) is a Spanish engineering company 
located in Zamudio. It manufactures wind turbines and provides onshore and offshore wind 
services. It is the world's second largest wind turbine manufacturer.
33. Viscofan is a Spanish manufacturer of casings for meat products. Viscofan has a 
commercial presence in over 100 countries around the world. It is the only world producer 
with the capacity to manufacture the four main technologies available on the casings or 
artificial casings market. The company is trading in the Madrid Stock Exchange General 
Index.
34. Acerinox, S.A. is a stainless steel manufacturing conglomerate group based in Spain. 
Nissan holds approximately 15% of Acerinox as of April 2010. The headquarters are 
in Madrid. As for 2008, the company was the world's largest producer of stainless steel.
35. CIE Automotive is an industrial group specialized in supplying components and 
subassemblies for the automotive market. It is listed on the Madrid and Bilbao stock 
markets, and it has a presence in four continents and 15 countries. CIE focuses its resources 
on three business areas: Automotive components (present in nine countries), Biofuels, (and 
Dominion, Technological solutions and services.
36. Distribuidora Internacional de Alimentación, S.A. (DIA) is an international supermarket 
chain, which as of 2012 operates stores internationally, making it Europe's third largest 
food sector franchiser. DIA is a discount supermarket chain, which follows a policy of 
reduction of prices by means of minimizing operational costs. The furniture and decoration 
of the store are minimal. Costs are also reduced by limiting the choice of products to a 
narrow selection of European brand names and white-label DIA brand goods. The chain 
also sells small appliances. Its policy of communication is based on mass media campaigns 
as well as periodic flyers featuring products, which are on special sale.
We then move to the17DAX30 firms. They are all MNCs, and part of the DAX30 firms.
37. BMW AG is an MNC currently producing automobiles and motorcycles, headquartered 
in Munich. In 2015, BMW was the world's twelfth largest producer of motor vehicles.
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38. Volkswagen AG is an automotive manufacturing MNC headquartered in Wolfsburg. It 
designs, manufactures and distributes vehicles, motorcycles, engines, and turbo machinery 
and offers related services including financing, leasing and fleet management. In 2016, it 
was the world's largest automaker by sales, overtaking Toyota and keeping this title in 2017 
and 2018.It has the largest market share in Europe for over two decades. It ranked seventh 
in the 2018 Fortune Global 500 list of the world's largest companies. It is divided into two 
primary divisions, the Automotive Division and the Financial Services Division. It also has 
two major joint ventures in China. It has operations in approximately 150 countries. The 
firm's operations in China have grown rapidly in the past decade with the country becoming 
its largest market. Volkswagen has a primary listing on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
(FSE), where it is a constituent of the Euro Stoxx 50 stock market index (STOXX), and 
secondary listings on other major exchanges. Volkswagen delisted from the LSE in 2013.
39. Adidas AG is an MNC, founded and headquartered in Bavaria. Adidas designs and 
manufactures shoes, clothing, and accessories. It is the largest sportswear manufacturer in 
Europe, and the second largest in the world, after Nike.
40. Daimler AG is an automotive MNC, headquartered in Stuttgart. By unit sales, it is the 
thirteenth-largest car manufacturer and is the largest truck manufacturer in the world. It 
also provides financial services. It is a component of the STOXX.
41. Continental AG is MNC specializing in parts for the automotive and transportation 
industries. It is based in Hanover and it is the world's fourth-largest tire manufacturer. After 
acquiring Siemens AG's VDO automotive unit in 2007, Continental was ranked third in 
global OEM automotive parts sales in 2012. In 2012, Continental returned to the 
benchmark DAX index of 30.
42. Henkel AG is a chemical and consumer goods MNC headquartered in Düsseldorf, 
Germany. It is active in both the consumer and industrial sector. The firm is organized into 
three globally operating business units (Laundry & Home Care, Beauty Care, and Adhesive 
Technologies). In the fiscal year 2017, Henkel reported sales of over 20 billion EUR. More 
than 80 percent of its employees work outside of Germany.
43. Beiersdorf AG is an MNC based in Hamburg, producing personal-care products and 
pressure-sensitive adhesives. Although its shares are publicly listed, Beiersdorf is 
controlled by Maxingvest AG, which directly owns 50.49% of shares.
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44. Bayer AG is a pharmaceutical and life sciences MNC, headquartered in Leverkusen. It is 
one of the largest pharmaceutical firms in the world. Bayer's areas of business include 
pharmaceuticals; consumer healthcare products; agricultural chemicals and biotechnology 
products; and high-value polymers. The firm is a component of STOXX. In 2014, it 
acquired Merck & Co.'s consumer business.
45. Fresenius SE & Co. KGaA is a health care MNC based in Bad Homburg. It provides 
products and services for dialysis, hospitals and medical care. In addition, the company 
focuses on hospital management as well as on engineering and services for medical centers 
and other health care facilities. The company is a component of STOXX.
46. Merck is a pharmaceutical, chemical, and life sciences MNC headquartered in Darmstadt. 
It is the world's oldest operating chemical and pharmaceutical firm and one of the largest 
pharmaceutical firms in the world. Merck operates in Europe, Africa, Asia, Oceania, and 
the Americas. In 2015, it adopted a new uniform brand identity for all its subsidiaries.
47. Fresenius Medical Care is an MNC specializing in the production of medical supplies, 
primarily to facilitate or aid renal dialysis. It is 30% owned by the health care company 
Fresenius. Fresenius Medical Care operates more than 40 production sites on all continents. 
Its largest plants are in the U.S., Germany, and Japan. 
48. Siemens AG is a conglomerate MNC headquartered in Berlin and Munich and the largest 
industrial manufacturing company in Europe with branch offices abroad. The principal 
divisions of the company are Industry, Energy, Healthcare and Infrastructure & Cities, 
which represent its main activities. It produces medical diagnostics equipment and its 
medical health-care division, which generates about 12% of the company's total sales, is its 
second-most profitable unit, after the industrial automation division. The company is a 
component of STOXX. Siemens reported revenue of €83 billion in 2018.
49. BASF SE is a chemical MNC and the largest chemical producer in the world. The BASF 
operates six integrated production sites in all continents. Its headquarters are in 
Ludwigshafen. BASF has customers in over 190 countries. It is currently expanding its 
international activities with a focus on Asia. BASF is listed on the FSE, LSE, and Zurich 
Stock Exchange. BASF delisted from the NYSE in 2007. It is a component of STOXX.
50. HeidelbergCement (HEI) is one of the largest building material MNCs in the world 
headquartered in Heidelberg. HEI is the number one producer of construction aggregates, 
the number two in cement and number three in ready-mixed concrete worldwide.
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51. ThyssenKrupp AG is an MNC with a focus on industrial engineering and steel production. 
The company is based in Duisburg and Essen. It is one of the world's largest steel 
producers, ranked tenth largest worldwide by revenue in 2015.In addition to steel 
production, ThyssenKrupp's products range from machines and industrial services to high-
speed trains, elevators, and shipbuilding. Subsidiary ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems also 
manufactures frigates, corvettes, and submarines.
52. Linde plc is an Irish-domiciled chemical MNC. It is the world's largest industrial gas firm 
by market share as well as revenue. Linde shares are traded in Germany and the US and 
included in DAX 30 and S&P 500 stock market indices. In 2006, it acquired its UK based 
competitor the BOC Group and subsequently disposed of its non-gas interests. In 2005, 
Linde AG and BOC together had 21% of the world's market in industrial gases.
53. Covestro is an MNC and a world-leading supplier of high-tech polymer materials. They are 
the partner for a wide variety of industries. Covestro is a Bayer spin-off formed in the fall 
of 2015. Covestro shares were first offered on the FSE in 2015. Bayer sold its entire 
remaining stake in May 2018. The main industries served are automotive manufacturing 
and supply, electrical engineering and electronics, construction and home products, and 




This table compares and contrasts the base case scenario results with the results using seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) as a robustness check.
Hypothesis Markets Time Period Base Case scenario SUR Method
Full Sample 11 firms are exposed at least at 10%, five 
positive and six negative
12 exposed at least at 10%, five positive and 
seven negative
Pre-referendum SMIN positively exposed at 5% SMIN positively exposed at 5%
FTSE
Post-referendum Seven (Nine) exposed at 5%(10%), six 
negative and three positive
Nine (11) exposed at least at 5%(10%), 
seven negative and four positive
Full Sample ITX positively exposed at 1% ITX positively exposed at 1%
Pre-referendum ITX positively exposed at 5% ITX positively exposed at 5%
IBEX
Post-referendum No firm exposed No firm exposed
Full Sample Merck positively exposed at 10% Adidas positively exposed at 5% and Merck 
and Covestro at 10%
Pre-referendum Merck positively exposed at 1% Merck positively exposed at 1%
H2 and H3
DAX
Post-referendum Siemens positively exposed at 5% and 
HEI at 10%
Adidas and Siemens positively exposed at 
5% and Covestro at 10%
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Table A2-continued
Hypothesis Markets Base Case scenario SUR Method
FTSE Five (Nine) firms are exposed at least at 5% (10%) Eight (Nine) firms are exposed at least at 5% (10%)
IBEX ITX and SGRE are negatively affected by Brexit at 5%; ITX 
and Viscofan are positively exposed at 5% and 10% 
respectively
ITX and SGRE are negatively affected by Brexit at 5%; ITX 
and Viscofan are positively exposed at 5% and 10% 
respectively
H4a
DAX No firm is exposed Merck is positively exposed at 10%
FTSE Five firms are exposed at 5%. The systematic risk of SKG and 
AZN increases at 5% and 10% respectively
Seven firms are exposed at 5%. The systematic risk of SKG 
and AZN increases at 5% and 10% respectively
IBEX ITX and Visofan are exposed at 5%. The systematic risk of 
SGRE and Acerinox decrease at 5% and 10% respectively
ITX and Visofan are exposed at 5%. The systematic risk of 
SGRE, Acerinox and ArcelorMittal decrease at 5%, 10% and 
10% respectively
H4b
DAX The systematic risk of Siemens increases and of HEI decreases The systematic risk of Siemens increases and of HEI decreases
FTSE SMIN is exposed at 5% and SN and Mondi at 10%. Brexit 
strengthens the exposure of ABF
SMIN and Barratt are exposed at 5% and SN and Mondi at 
10%. Brexit strengthens the exposure of ABF
IBEX ITX is exposed at 10% ITX is exposed at 5%
H4c
DAX Merck is positively exposed at 5% Merck is positively exposed at 1%
SMIN, Merck and ITX are  positively exposed and SN and HEI  
are negatively exposed
SMIN, Barratt, Merck and ITX are positively exposed and SN, 
Acerinox and HEI are negatively exposed
FTSE (1) The systematic risk of SKG increases 
(2) The FX exposure of ABF increases
(3) The FX exposures of Mondi and Croda decrease
(1) The systematic risk of SKG increases
(2) The FX exposure of ABF increases
(3) The FX exposures of Mondi and Croda decrease
IBEX The systematic risk of SGRE decreases The systematic risk of SGRE decreases 
H4d
DAX Siemens is  positively exposed and HEI is negatively exposed at 
5%, affected through the index
Siemens is positively exposed and HEI is negatively exposed at 
5%, affected through the index
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Table A2-continued
Hypothesis Time Periods Markets Base Case scenario SUR Method
FTSE (1) Two (five) firms are exposed to appreciations at 
least at 5% (10%)
(2) Eight firms are exposed at either appreciations or 
depreciations at least at 10% 
(3) Four firms are exposed to changes but not to 
depreciation or appreciation
(4) Tesco is negatively exposed to appreciation at 
10%, not to changes
(1) Five (six) firms are exposed to appreciations 
at least at 5% (10%)
(2) 10 firms are exposed at either appreciations 
or depreciations at least at 10%
(3) Three firms are exposed to changes but not 
to depreciation or appreciation
(4) Tesco is negatively exposed to appreciation 
at 10%, not to changes
IBEX (1) ITX is positively exposed to depreciation at 1%; 
Viscofan is positively exposed to appreciation at 1%
(2) ITX and Viscofan are exposed to changes
(1) ITX is positively exposed to depreciation at 1%; 
Viscofan is positively exposed to appreciation at 1%
(2) ITX and Viscofan are exposed to changes
H5 Full Sample
DAX Three firms are exposed to appreciations and two 
firms are exposed to depreciations but none of these 
firms are exposed to changes
Three firms are exposed to appreciations and 
Covestro is exposed to depreciations but none of 
these firms are exposed to changes
FTSE Five firms are exposed at either appreciations or 
depreciations at least at 10%
Four firms are exposed at either appreciations or 
depreciations at least at 10%
IBEX Four firms are exposed to depreciations and none to 
appreciations
Four firms are exposed to depreciations and none to 
appreciations
Pre-referendum
DAX Two firms are exposed to depreciations and BMW is 
positively exposed to appreciation 
Two firms are exposed to depreciations and BMW is 
positively exposed to appreciation
Post-referendum FTSE (1) 12 firms are exposed to either appreciations or 
depreciations
(2) Three firms are exposed before and after the vote
(3) KGF and SMIN are exposed before but not after 
the vote
(4) Most firms are exposed after the vote
(5) RR and SN are exposed before the vote, the 
exposure intensifies after the vote
(6) NXT is exposed to appreciation before the vote 
and to depreciation after the vote
(1) 12 firms are exposed to either appreciations or 
depreciations
(2) Two firms are exposed before and after the vote
(3) KGF and SMIN are exposed before but not after 
the vote
(4) Most firms are exposed after the vote
(5) RR is exposed not before but after the vote. SN 
is exposed before the vote, the exposure intensifies 
after the vote
(6) NXT is exposed to appreciation before and to 
depreciation after the vote
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    IBEX (1) FER is negatively exposed to depreciation and 
Viscofan is positively exposed to appreciation at 5%
(2) ITX, Grifols, Acerinox and CIE are exposed 
before but not after the vote
(1) FER is negatively exposed to depreciation and 
Viscofan is positively exposed to appreciation at 5%
(2) ITX, Grifols, Acerinox, and CIE are exposed 
before but not after the vote
DAX Five firms are exposed to either appreciations or 
depreciations
Four firms are exposed to either appreciations or 
depreciations
Notes: The full results are available upon request.
